From Common Law Logic-Chopper to Land-Use Planner Eulogy for the Lawyer as Social Engineer by Roberts, E. F.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 6 July 1968 Article 1
From Common Law Logic-Chopper to Land-Use
Planner Eulogy for the Lawyer as Social Engineer
E. F. Roberts
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
E. F. Roberts, From Common Law Logic-Chopper to Land-Use Planner Eulogy for the Lawyer as Social Engineer , 53 Cornell L. Rev. 957
(1968)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol53/iss6/1
CORN ELL
LAW F1 EV! EW
Volume 53 July 1968 Number 6
FROM COMMON LAW LOGIC-CHOPPER TO
LAND-USE PLANNER: EULOGY FOR THE
LAWYER AS SOCIAL ENGINEER
E. F. Robertst
The angry Buzz of a Multitude is one of the bloodiest Noises
in the World.
-The First Marquess of Halifax.*
The standard of living attained in the most advanced indus-
trial areas is not a suitable model of development if the aim is paci-
fication. In view of what this standard has made of Man and Nature,
the question must again be asked whether it is worth the sacrifices
and the victims made in its defense. The question has ceased to be
irresponsible since the "affluent society" has become a society of
permanent mobilization against the risk of annihilation, and since
the sale of its goods has been accompanied by moronization, the
perpetuation of toil, and the promotion of frustration.
-Herbert Marcuse.**
This article starts out innocently to examine the case-by-case
process through which rules designed to resolve incursions into air-
space were formulated. Not until a crowded urban environment made
the resolution of this kind of dispute a practical necessity did the
process emerge from a conceptual bog and produce clear-cut decisions.
In substance, the law has concerned itself with corporations and estate
planning, concerns of the well-to-do, and its only real impact on the
commonalty was the backlash of the social engineering inherent in the
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1952, Northeastern University; LL.B.
1954, Boston College.
* THE CoMPLErE WoRKs OF GEORGE SAvILE, FPsr MARQUESS OF HALIFAX 219 (W.
Raleigh ed. 1912).
** H. MARCUSE, ONE-DiszENsioNAL MAN 242 (1964).
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creation of a fault-centered system of liability to subsidize the indus-
trialization of society.
The question then arises: Has the law done much of late to
improve the general environment in which people live? Nuisance doc-
trine and zoning laws seem efficient only in the creation of middle-class
suburban retreats. The law seems concerned with the environment of
a particular class-the suburbanites-but this, after all, is essentially
the same class as had hitherto been estate-planning conscious. If the
law has not had much direct impact upon the common man, its con-
centration of late on the construction of middle-class rings around the
cities promises to aggravate the plight of a growing class of center-city
poor and, perforce, to contribute to the cause of riots in the cities.
Thus, it is questionable, whether there is merit in the assertion
that lawyers are social engineers. Have lawyers been able to organize
the case system in such a way that it decides the allocation of loss in
our technological era with the same remarkable clarity that distin-
guished the nineteenth century's fault system of liability? The attempt
to allocate losses attributable to the rise in commercial aviation illus-
trates that modern complexities defy application of the case system's
binary logic, and suggests that legislation provides the key to the
future.
The lawyer-legislators have proved adept at devising fiscal and
monetary schemes to maintain the level of production necessary to
keep the suburban syndrome alive. In the process, however, there has
been a vacuum in social engineering designed to make the environ-
ment of the poor habitable and to promise them real participation in
our consumer society.
The riots in center city belie the conventional assumption that
affluence necessarily will filter down to the poor, removing the cause
of discontent. Indeed, the need to divert resources into center city
requires more direct government intervention in the economy in the
form of planning. At the same time, the locally-oriented zoning style
of land-use planning seems due for an overhaul in the form of metro-
politan area planning based upon considerable powers of condemna-
tion. On their record as social engineers, do the lawyers have claim to
lead the march toward a planned society? The substance of this article
is that the answer is plainly no. The lawyers might be better advised to
perfect their own technical competence in traditional functions and
to leave the social engineering to a new body of experts, the product
of a new discipline attuned to the needs of the tventy-first century.
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I
A STUDY IN TIME AND MOTION-LEGAL RESPONSES TO AN
AGE-OLD PROBLEM
A. Trespass into Space
Imagine, if you will, a charming balcony, perchance like Juliet's,
overhanging a pleasant garden scene below. Lest the scene inspire non-
productive reverie, let us quickly shatter the idyll by positing the
further fact that the balcony protrudes into a neighbor's airspace and
overhangs his garden. We have, therefore, a simple set of facts and an
equally simple question: What are the neighbor's rights? It ought to
be possible to evaluate rather easily the efficiency with which the
lawyers, armed with these simple facts, come up with solutions.
A similar problem attracted the scrutiny of Lord Ellenborough sit-
ting nisi prius at Westminster on Tuesday, June 20, 1815.1 The plain-
tiff brought an action in trespass against his neighbor after discovering
that the heedless fellow had affixed a board to his house in such a way
that the board overhung the plaintiff's garden. Citing the maxim Cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum as his major premise, plaintiff's
counsel developed the argument that since the space over the garden,
like the minerals beneath it, belonged to the plaintiff, his domain had
been invaded, i.e., trespassed upon. Lord Ellenborough would have
none of this:
I do not think it is trespass to interfere with the column of air
superincumbent on the dose.... I am by no means prepared to say,
that firing [a gun] across a field in vacuo, no part of the contents
touching it, amounts to a clausum fregit. Nay, if this board over-
hanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow that an
aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quaere clausum fregit, at
the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon passes
in the course of his voyage.2
The plaintiff was then advised to bring an action upon the case if he
could prove damage.
Granting the truth of the plaintiff's maxim, wasn't the hypo-
thetical balloonist a trespasser, since plaintiff "owned" an elongated,
inverted three-dimensional pyramid of space? One answer is that the
opinion was merely a humorous exercise, whose "real" holding was
1 Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219, 171 Eng. Rep. 70 (K.B. 1815).
2 Id. at 220-21, 171 Eng. Rep. at 70-71. But see Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co., [1957]
2 Q.B. 334, [1957] 2 All E.R. 343.
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that plaintiff's remedy was self-help.3 Another is that, notwithstanding
the florid locutions of the property lawyers, trespass was a possessory
remedy, and the trial bar understood possession only in its practical
sense.4 If this was so, Lord Ellenborough's mention of an action on the
case appears to have been an invitation to pursue an illusory remedy,
since the harm was not to plaintiff's possession, but rather to his sense
of monopolistic dominion over his territory.5
Granting for the moment that plaintiff could prove harm, even a
successful action on the case would seem to be a judicial sanction of
the invasion, in effect, letting defendant purchase an inroad into his
unwilling neighbor's territory. Should the aggrieved party insist upon
his rights to be free from the incursion, ejectment would appear to be
3 For example, overhanging branches traditionally have been a proper problem for
self-help, and not an appropriate subject of concern of the courts. Michalson v. Nutting,
275 Mass. 232, 175 N.E. 490 (1931). But see Bonde v. Bishop, 112 Cal. App. 2d 1, 245 P.2d
617 (1952); Ferrara v. Metz, 49 Misc. 2d 531, 267 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
4 See, e.g., Anonymous, Y.B. Hill. 21 Edw. 4, 74, pl. 6 (1482), where it was agreed that
where B wrongfully took A's horse, and C wrongfully took the animal from B, still C was
no trespasser as to A since he had not taken the horse out of A's possession. See 3 T. STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 237-38 (1906). Students of property lore will also recall a
case involving some fishermen who rowed their boat through a rival crew's net which
nearly encircled a school of fish. The English judges refused to say that the rivals had
possession because all but reducing into possession was not possession. Young v. Hitchens,
1 Day. & Mer. 592, 115 Eng. Rep. 228 (Q.B. 1844).
For those who acquired in law school a fondness for problems of possession as illus-
trated by animals ferae naturae, two recent cases may be of some interest. Commonwealth
v. Ag-way, Inc., 210 Pa. Super. 150, 232 A.2d 69 (1967), involved a state suing for the value
of fish killed as a result of defendant's stream pollution. The court refused to countenance
this novel approach to pollution control because fish "running wild . . . are not the
subject of property until they are reduced to possession ...." Id. at 152, 232 A.2d at 70.
Quaere, why should the sovereign necessarily have to "own" the fish in order to hold de-
fendant accountable for their destruction?
In Regina v. Howlett, Times L. Rep., Feb. 5, 1968, the Court of Appeal wrestled with
the question whether mussels naturally adhering to the shore can be stolen. The same
reports, on Feb. 6th, reveal, per Lord Justice Diplock:
Because prosecution evidence was inadequate to show that mussels had been
reduced into possession, the Court quashed the convictions ....
The prosecution had alleged that the foreshore was the property of the le
Strange estate as a consequence of a grant by the Crown in 1189 ....
The first point argued by Mr. Albery was that mussels were not capable of
being the subject of larceny because of adherence to the realty, and the second
was that, if they did not adhere, they were wild animals ferae naturae incapable
of being stolen until reduced into possession....
Their Lordships did not think it necessary to decide whether mussels did
form part of the realty.
See also Warner v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, Times L. Rep., May 2, 1968, at 7, col. 1.
5 For the fate of a plaintiff who relied upon a judge's advice for the "correct" remedy,
read in order: Ward v. Macauley, 4 D.&E. 489, 100 Eng. Rep. 1135 (K.B. 1791); Gordon v.
Harper, 7 D.&E. 9, 101 Eng. Rep. 828 (K.B. 1796).
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the more productive remedy. A New York court in 1861, however, held
that ejectment would not lie in the instance of overhanging eaves and
gutters, for the simple reason that plaintiff had not been deprived of
possession in such a way that the sheriff could escort him back into
possession.6 Again it appears that the procedural system was pro-
grammed to deal only with invasions of actual possession and was not
adequate to remedy intrusions into the theoretical realm of overhead
space. Again the court had a helpful suggestion as to the correct avenue
of approach to the problem, this time citing plaintiff to an action on
the case for nuisance. But more of nuisance in a moment.
In terms of law as a Pavlovian-style discipline of rote-learned rules
and appropriate intellectual responses, 7 both courts cited thus far were
probably right when they limited both trespass and ejectment to deal-
ing with practical possession. Later critics, however, complained that
trespass did not cover invasion of spatial territory admittedly owned
by the victim. In 1887 Pollack said:
Clearly there can be a wrongful entry on land below the surface, as
by mining, and in fact this kind of trespass is rather prominent in
our modern books. It does not seem possible on the principles of
the common law to assign any reason why an entry at any height
above the surface should not also be a trespass. The improbability
of actual damage may be an excellent practical reason for not suing
a man who sails over one's land in a balloon; but this appears irrel-
evant to the pure legal theory.s
Theory, it should be observed, had gained a limited victory over com-
mon sense.
The concept of the inviolate corridor in space over a fee simple
was confirmed in Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co.,9 a 1906 New York
decision. Butler brought an action of ejectment against a telephone
company when it ran a wire through his airspace with neither permis-
sion nor authority. The company argued that although either trespass
or case might lie, ejectment did not because it had not ousted plaintiff
from possession. The court, however, seized the opportunity to address
itself to the jurisprudential question: "What is 'real property?'"
If the wire had touched the surface of the land in permanent
and exclusive occupation, it is conceded that the plaintiff would
0 Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb. 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861).
7 Those readers who imagine themselves Tories in the true sense of that word would
do well to reflect upon modem "learning" theory as manifested in programmed instruc-
tion. See, e.g., C. KELsO, A PROGRAMMED INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW (1965). See
also Eysenck, The Teaching Machine, ENCOUNTER, May 1966, at 7.
8 F. POLLACK, TORTS 281 (1887).
9 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906).
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have been dispossessed pro tanto. A part of his premises would not
have been in his possession, but in the possession of another. The
extent of the disseisin, however, does not control, for an owner is
entitled to the absolute and undisturbed possession of every part
of his premises, including the space above, as much as a mine be-
neath. If the wire had been a huge cable, several inches thick and
but a foot above the ground, there would have been a difference in
degree, but not in principle. Expand the wire into a beam .... En-
large the beam into a bridge .... Unless the principle of usque ad
coelum is abandoned any physical, exclusive and permanent occu-
pation of space above land is ... a disseisin of the owner to that
extent.'0
Principle won, and the remedy was simple: "The sheriff can . . . de-
liver occupied space by removing the occupying structure."" Since the
defendant had removed the wire before trial, however, the sheriff was
spared the trouble, and thus the case might better be read as holding
that trespass would lie.'
2
Ignoring the fact that the wire had been removed before trial, the
Butler decision seems at best a Phyrric victory for theory and principle,
and at worst a procedural booby trap for the unwaryt Indeed, the
casual reference to the sheriff is almost incredible in light of the same
court's previous decision in Hahl v. Sugo.'3 In that celebrated debacle,
plaintiff successfully obtained an ejectment judgment upon discovering
that his neighbor's building encroached upon his land. The triumph
proved short-lived, however, since the sheriff returned the writ of ex-
ecution unsatisfied after finding that the "intruder" was a monstrous
stone wall. The plaintiff next entered equity in search of relief, but
met an intellectual stone wall when the court invoked the doctrine of
election of remedies.
:o Id. at 491-92, 79 N.E. at 718. This triumph of theory over pragmatism is worth
pursuing. For example, A. CASNER & W. LEAcH, CASES ON PROPERTY (1951), is "conceptual"
in the sense that it treats in a logical order the concepts induced from the common law's
pragmatic assault on problems. C. BFRGER, LAND OWNERSHn AND USE (1968), is more
modem in its emphasis on land-use planning, but this book opens with a jurisprudential
inquiry as to "what is property?" Quaere, to what extent is the case-oriented common law
system being replaced by a pseudo-civil law system organized around Uniform Codes,
and around doctrines like strict liability parroted by the cases? For a critique of the func-
tional approach, see H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 96-99 (1964).
11 186 N.Y. at 492, 79 N.E. at 718.
12 The real issue in Butler was one of costs, since in trespass plaintiff would not have
been entitled to them if he recovered less than fifty dollars. As it was, he recovered six
cents. For another episode where the battle over costs "made law," see Roberts, Negli-
gence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNE. L.Q.
191, 197 (1965).
13 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901).
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B. The Illusory Remedy of Nuisance
Still in search of an answer to our balcony hypothetical, it may
prove expedient in light of Hahl to forget Butler and backtrack to
Aiken v. Benedict.14 There the court suggested that the correct remedy
for projecting eaves was an action on the case for nuisance. Indeed, the
court said that "if the defendant should be convicted, the judgment
would be for damages and an abatement of the nuisance."'15 More help-
ful still, the court cited plaintiff to "2 R.S. 332 §§ 1-7, and Code,
§§ 453, 454." 16 Ironically, according to the notes appended to the cita-
tion to the Revised Statute sections,17 the common law writ of nuisance
described therein was abolished by one of the cited Code sections!' 8
At first blush, this is rather disconcerting.
Backtracking even further, there were two classic common-law
remedies for private nuisance. The first was a writ of quad permittat
prosterne under which the defendant was cited to show cause why the
plaintiff should not be permitted to abate the nuisanse.19 The second
was by way of an assize of nuisance "in which the sheriff was com-
manded to summon a jury to view the premises, and, if they found for
the plaintiff, he had judgment to have the nuisance abated and for
damages." 20 Both remedies were so enmeshed with hypertechnical re-
finements, however, that once it was decided in Cantrel v. Church2'
that an action of case lay wherever an assize of nuisance did, it "fol-
lowed naturally that trespass on the case became the usual and estab-
lished remedy for nuisance." 22 Indeed, Blackstone reveals that both
remedies were out of use in his day, and that plaintiff had the option
either to collect damages by way of case or to exercise self-help.23
New York was one of the states that provided for abatement by
statute,24 and the provision in the Revised Statutes was much like the
procedure involved in the assize of nuisance. 25 The Code abolished
14 89 Barb. 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861).
is Id. at 402.
10 Id.
17 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 343 § 1 (1862).
18 N.Y. CODE OF PRocEuR § 453 (8th ed. J. Townshend 1864).
19 J. JoYcE & H. JOYcE, LAW o" NuIsANcas 520-21 (1906).
20 Id.
21 Cro. Eliz. 845, 78 Eng. Rep. 1072 (Ex. 1601).
22 McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L.
REv. 27, 43 (1948).
23 8 BLACmstONE, CoMmEA EIEs 222 (9th ed. 1783).
24 "Provision is made in many of the States for an abatement upon order of court
after verdict...." H. WooD, LAw oF NuisANc.as 975 (2d ed. 1883).
25 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 343-44 §§ 1-7 (1862).
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this "writ of nuisance," providing instead that an action might be
brought "as [for] other injuries; and in such action there may be judg-
ment for damages, or for the removal of the nuisance, or both." 26 Thus,
the problem of the overhanging eaves in Aiken is solved simply by an
action in case, and, if plaintiff succeeds in proving his facts, an order
for abatement plus damages follows. What then is one to make of the
advice that this remedy "is not encouraged,"27 and of the further testi-
mony that "only in extreme cases" will a law court order the abate-
ment?2s
This whole affair becomes more curious on reading the opinion in
Kintz v. McNeal,29 decided in 1845 when the statutory writ of nuisance
was still available in New York.
The remedies by assize of nuisance, and quod permittat pros-
ternere have been out of use in England for two or three centuries;
and this is probably the first instance in which a writ of nuisance
was ever prosecuted in this state. How the parties have got on so far
with this antiquated and very difficult proceeding, I am unable to
say; but it has probably been by consent. The assize of nuisance is
an existing remedy in Pennsylvania: but the court have found
it necessary to disregard the ancient forms, and adopt the action to
modern practice .... It is doubtful whether we have any right to
modernize this remedy; and I am disposed to adopt the language
of Ch. J. Eyre... and say, if you will have a writ of nuisance, you
must follow the course marked out by the law.30
Moreover, the Code provision abolishing the writ as of 1849 was pre-
sumably designed "to modernize" the remedy.
After 1849, courts of equity assumed jurisdiction in nuisance cases
to enjoin private nuisances and to award damages.31 Interestingly
enough, an analogy to trespass was cited in several cases:
So though every common trespass is not a foundation for an injunc-
tion, where it is only contingent and temporary; yet if it continues
so long as to become a nuisance, in such a case the court will inter-
fere and grant an injunction to restrain the person from com-
mitting it.32
It should be observed, however, that these cases involved an offensive
26 N.Y. CODE OF PROCEDuRE § 454 (8th ed. J. Townshend 1864).
27 H. WooD, Liv or NuxsAcEs 865 n.2 (1875).
28 H. WooD, supra note 24, at 975.
29 1 Denio 436 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
30 Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
31 E.g., Hutchins v. Smith, 63 Barb. 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872); Davis v. Lambertson,
56 Barb. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868).
32 Davis v. Lambertson, 56 Barb. 480, 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). See also Hutchins v.
Smith, 63 Barb. 251, 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
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cheese factory3 and a lime kiln 4 next door to the plaintiffs, and did
not involve actual trespasses. Thus, although a nuisance next door
was, after 1849, properly a subject for an equity court and an action on
the case for damages,35 our initial inquiry remains unanswered: How
is an overhanging balcony to be removed?
If an overhanging balcony is a trespass into airspace, as Butler
indicates, the answer seems elementary: Equity will enjoin a trespass
if the remedy at law is inadequate. In Williams v. New York Central
R.R. 86 equity enjoined a railroad company that laid tracks across plain-
tiff's land.
Although he had a remedy at law for the trespass, yet, as the trespass
was of a continuous nature, he had a right to come into a court of
equity, and to invoke its restraining power to prevent a multiplicity
of suits, and can of course recover his damages as incidental to this
equitable relief.37
Thus, if an overhanging balcony is a trespass, and is a continuing one,
we have solved our problem.
Parenthetically, perhaps, the concept of a "continuous" trespass
must be understood. For our purposes, this definition should suffice:
To remain on land after a trespassory entry thereon is in itself
also a trespass, a "continuing trespass" as it is commonly styled. So,
if A places a chattel on B's land and is successfully sued by B in tres-
pass for this act, he is liable, if he fails thereafter to remove it, to
further actions in trespass for the continued presence of the chattel
on the land.38
We are now ready to construct a matrix to set the problem of the
overhanging balcony in context. A good beginning is Professor Powell's
discussion of the
three common law classes of land injury. If the defendant ousted
plaintiff from possession, he was a disseisor; if he invaded plaintiff's
possession he was a trespasser; but if he interfered with plaintiff's
use and enjoyment of his property by acts done elsewhere than on
plaintiff's land he became subject to the twelfth century assize of
nuisance.3 9
Thus, so long as plaintiff was restricted to "practical" possession, as
opposed to postulating ownership of the airspace over his land, eject-
33 Davis v. Lambertson, 56 Barb. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868).
34 Hutchins v. Smith, 63 Barb. 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
85 See, e.g., Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun. 565, 2 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
36 16 N.Y. 97 (1857).
37 Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
38 H. STP=T, LAw OF TORTs 62 (2d ed. 1959).
39 R. PoWi_=, 5 THE LAW oF REAL PROPERTY 704, at 317-18 (1968).
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ment would'not lay because there was no ouster-witness Aiken. Simi-
larly, trespass was of no avail because his "possession" was not invaded
-witness Pickering. Since the harm was "done elsewhere" by this nar-
row conceptualization of the plaintiff's fee simple, the assize of nui-
sance was the correct remedy, and the advice of the Aiken court was,
for its time, quite correct.
Once Butler was decided, however, plaintiff was given rights in
possession of the superincumbent air column over his fee, and the
matrix had to be rebuilt. In theory ejectment might now lie for an
"ouster," but Hahl discouraged further development along this line.
Since the harm perpetrated was now within the zone of plaintiff's
"possession," it followed that neither an action on the case for nuisance
nor an equity action to enjoin a nuisance was an appropriate remedy.
The elementary answer was that the installation of an overhanging
balcony was a trespass, that its presence constituted a continuing tres-
pass, and that a court of equity would remedy the situation. In order
to prove this thesis, it is simply necessary to find a modem court en-
joining an overhanging balcony as a continuing trespass rather than
upon nuisance grounds.
In, a 1957 Queen's Bench decision, Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco
Co.,40 the court held that an advertising sign projecting from the wall
of an adjoining building and into airspace above the plaintiff's shop was
a continuing trespass and would be enjoined as such. Justice McNair,
repudiating Lord Ellenborough, reasoned that superincumbent airspace
must belong with the fee, else the Air Navigation Act,41 removing the
right of landowners to sue aeronauts in trespass, would have made no
sense. Herein lies irony galore, since the aeronauts cited as evidence of
the existence of rights in space today threaten to destroy the habitability
of the fee itself.
C. A Legal System for All the People
It took from 1815 to 1957 for the law to work its way from Lord
Ellenborough's nay to Justice McNair's yea to the question: Would
trespass lie? In the meantime some plaintiffs seeking to remove a bal-
-coney tried ejectment and failed. Others were cited to the ancient writs
of nuisance, and probably were discouraged by the intricacies of plead-
ing. In New York, the Code opened the door to equity's jurisdiction
to abate nuisances, but Butler was the real breakthrough when posses-
40 [1957] 2 Q.B. 334, [1957] 2 All E.R. 343.
41 Air Navigation Act of 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 80, § 9(1) (now Civil Aviation Act
of 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 67, § 40(1)).
[Vol. 53:957
SOCIAL ENGINEER
sion of space was recognized as a right protected by trespass. For a
time, however, our balcony problem involved a nuisance approach, and
it remains to be seen whether our matrix is yet free from influences
left over from this temporary association. 42
Are any lessons learned from a cursory survey of some one hun-
dred and forty years' worth of lawyers' logic-chopping over an over-
hanging balcony? A shift appears from the pragmatism evident in Lord
Ellenborough's day to the progressive conceptualization of the "ter-
ritory" of a fee simple. This conceptualism turned upon the defini-
tion of "possession," so that the logical apposition reflected by Pickering
and Kelsen could be depicted in terms of a yes-no, on-off binary system
of logic. In practice, however, the shift involved chasing up the suc-
cessive blind alleys of ejectment and nuisance, the latter diversion
being further complicated by intricate procedural roadblocks. Still,
there was evident throughout a concern for concepts, i.e,, the meaning
of possession, and for logic, i.e., whether one could intrude into non-
possessed zones. From society's view, however, this whole affair seems
to constitute a tremendous effort and, insofar as the actual victim of
such an intrusion is concerned, an unsatisfactory set of legal responses
prior to 1957.
The lack of adequate answers could mean that the problem was
not worth reflection until urbanization and the economic necessity of
building skyward made territory over a fee valuable in terms of hard
cash rather than pride of dominion. Perhaps the arrival of the ubiqui-
tous telephone wire marks the first time that courts seriously began to
look skyward and define rights in space.43 Admitting as much, the lag
between Butler and Kelsen does not reflect much credit upon the dis-
patch with which courts clarify conceptual muddles.
Moreover, abandonment of the application of the self-help doc-
trine to overhanging branches supports the idea that increasing urbani-
zation has caused the law to take the problem seriously. Thus, in Bonde
v. Bishop44 a California court in 1952 held that an overhanging oak
42 See consecutively Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 P. 753 (19,23) (overhanging bal-
cony is a nuisance); Bertram v. Orlando, 102 Cal. App. 2d 506, 227 P.2d 894 (1951) (en-
croaching building is a trespass); 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth.,
15 N.Y.2d 48, 203 N.E2d 486, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1964) (underground encroachment is a
continuing trespass).
43 Compare Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) with Wands.
worth Bd. of Works v. United Tel. Co., [1884] 13 Q.B.D. 904 (C.A.). See also Kelsen v.
Imperial Tobacco Co., [1957] 2 Q.B. 334, 343-44, [1957] 2 All E.R. 343, 350. The upshot of
this opening of the fee simple skyward, of course, has led to the developmeat of airspace
over railway yards in center-city. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1295, 88th Cong., 2d Ses. (1964).
44 112 Cal. App. 2d 1, 245 P.2d 617 (1952).
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limb, the source of an aerial bombardment of twigs, leaves and acorns
upon plaintiff's patio and roof, constituted a nuisance, and ordered
it abated by the owner. The court implicitly repudiated the notion that
the courts would thereby open themselves to "innumerable and, in
many instances, purely vexatious" actions. 45 More recently, a New York
court assumed jurisdiction to decide a case where roots from a neigh-
bor's tree were undermining a patio and fouling a swimming pool
pump notwithstanding plaintiff's defensive efforts at moat digging.46
Beautification campaigns and subdivision trends toward clustering
houses in a picturesque environment promise to end the paucity of
cases of this class.
But why the paucity of cases? Is it possible that two different kinds
of questions are involved in the law? One, our simple hypothetical
question, and the other a broader, social engineering style interroga-
tory? Our ruminations in terms of a simple human affairs problem do
not elicit much response, and such response as there is evidences that
lawyers make pretty heavy going of it. What if, instead of our balcony
problem, we were to inquire: Is a manufacturer liable to a consumer
injured by a defect in his product? In response to this question we are
immediately deluged with Brown v. Kendall47 and Winterbottom v.
Wright,4s illustrating the epoch of fault-centered liability, to say noth-
ing of today's Uniform Commercial Code and the recent strict tort
and implied warranty decisions.49 Can we, on the basis of this data,
suggest as a hypothesis that the law, for all of its rhetoric, has never
been as concerned with individuals as with broad issues affecting the
structure of economic and political society? Is social engineering merely
social planning on a broad scale at the expense of the individual prob-
lems at the over-the-back-fence level of society?
If for one hundred and fifty years after 1800 a citizen could not
obtain a clear response to a question about an overhanging balcony,
and if he was told to exercise self-help if he complained about an over-
hanging tree limb, the reflective citizen might begin to doubt the
degree to which "law" protected the security of his home. Similarly,
Mapp v. Ohio,5° if we are to believe Justice Brennan's lamentations
45 This is one of the rationales for the old self-help doctrine, taken from Michalson
v, Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 234, 175 N.E. 490, 491 (1931).
46 Ferrara v. Metz, 49 Misc. 2d 531, 267 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
47 60 Mass. (6 Gush.) 292 (1850).
48 10 Mees. & Wels. 109, 152 All E.R. 402 (Ex. 1842).
49 E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
50 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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over unconscionable police activity,51 supports an inference that the
citizen was not secure until 1961 from invasions by the police, to say
nothing of invasions by health inspectors. 52, Presumably, a citizen's
security depended on his position in the socio-political hierarchy and
on the fact that the police "knew their place"rain short, his rights were
commensurate with his social standing. The owner of a mere "cottage"
beset by dangerous tree limbs by day and intruding authorities by
night, notwithstanding the rhetoric expended in his behalf,5 could not
expect much in the way of either physical or emotional security in
terms of the law.
Instantly the optimist, delivering one of those dreary Rule of Law
exhortations on Law Day, will object that all this has changed-witness
the Mapp decision and its progeny and the recent judicial interest in
overhanging trees. No matter what history may have been, he will
insist, the law in the sixties has finally substantiated the ideal that
every man's home is his castle. The fact is that the law has arrived with
51 1961 James Madison Lecture at the N.Y.U. School of Law:
Far too many cases come from the states to the Supreme Court presenting dismal
pictures of official lawlessness, of illegal searches and seizures, illegal detentions
attended by prolonged interrogation and coerced admissions of guilt, of the denial
of counsel and downright brutality.
Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761, 778 (1961).
52 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), before it was overruled by Camara v.
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967), crystallized the conventional wisdom that health
searches required no warrant. To discover how widespread these antics were, see the
citations collected in Comment, Pre-Dawn Welfare Inspections and the Right of Privacy,
44 J. URBAN L. 119, 122-23 & n.23 (1966).
53 E.g., Coke's postulate: "That the house of every one is to him as his . . . Castle
and Fortress." Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604). In
his dissent in Frank v. Maryland, Justice Douglas relied upon Pitt's famous speech to the
effect that:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown.
It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm
may enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter-all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
859 U.S. at 378-79. The idea is charming, but reality suggests that search warrants are to
be obtained in England for the asking. See, e.g., Letter from Professor E. C. S. Wade, The
Times (London), Aug. 31, 1967, at 7, col. 3. Sad to relate, even social standing seems to be
of little avail these days in England. Thus, in a Times leader, one can find:
What the Lord Chancellor had to say in the House of Lords yesterday about
the recent drug raid on Lady Diana Cooper's home goes to confirm the suspicion
that there is far too much of the rubber stamp about the issue of search warrants
by justices of the peace. The police application for a warrant was based on an
anonymous message, but "this was not disclosed to the magistrate who signed the
warrant for the search."...
Things are not what they were when the elder Pitt could say that "the
poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown."
The Times (London), March 6, 1968, at 13, col. 1-2.
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too little, too late. Vulgar police intrusions into the home are no longer
needed in order to maintain discrete surveillance of the population in
our technological era.54 At the same time, the aid now afforded the
homeowner to ward off dangerous tree limbs and offensive roots is
fairly irrelevant if the environment in which his now "secure" castle
is situated is beyond his control. 55 It may be that the sanctity of the
home has actually been eroding, rather than progressing during our
lifetime; a fact which, if true, will shortly necessitate some rethinking
of the significance of the home.
II
COMMON LAW IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
The common law technique for controlling environment was nui-
sance. Nuisance, however, was dealt with in terms of "fault" simply
because fault, in the nineteenth century, was seen as fundamental to
the imposition of any legal liability. 6 This fault syndrome is manifest,
for example, in the original Restatement of Torts. In order for a
defendant's activity to merit a money damages sanction, his behavior
had to be susceptible to pigeonholing in such conventional terms as
"intentional and unreasonable," "negligent," or "ultrahazardous."' 5
Furthermore, even assuming defendant's behavior was susceptible to
pejorative cataloging as intentional, monetary liability, to say nothing
of injunctive relief, did not follow unless his conduct could also be
labelled unreasonable. This latter opprobrium did not apply when
54 There is no reason to doubt... that by the year 2000 it will be possible to
place a man under constant surveillance without his ever becoming aware of it.
Moreover, since the culture will become cognizant of this advance, men will live
with the constant possibility that they are under surveillance without ever being
able to be sure whether this is so.
Kalven, The Problems of Privacy in the Year 2000, DAEDALUS, 876 (1967). A survey of
some of the more sophisticated devices can be gleaned from Note, Anthropotelemetry:
Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 HARv. L. REv. 403 (1966). For an enlightening discussion
of Alan F. Westin's PRIvAcY AND FREmDOm (1967), see Engberg, A Public View of Privacy,
THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan. 1968, at 69. See also Fried Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
55 Consider the following:
What are the basic rights of an American citizen in the remaining third of
the twentieth century? Does he have the right to be exposed to nature's own
weather? The right not to be exposed to manmade environmental contaminants
injurious to health? The right not to be subjected to . . . life-shortening in-
fluences? The right not to be subjected to extraordinary noise?
Green, The New Technological Era: A View from the Law, BuLL. AroMic SCIENTISTS,
Nov. 1967, at 12, 17-18.
56 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 12, at 204-13.
57 REsrATEmENT oF TORTS, § 822 (1939).
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Sufficient social value could be credited to defendant's activities.58 A
few cases will readily illustrate the significance of this body of doctrine,
particularly the impact of the social value factor.
In Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 9 plaintiffs
had farms with an aggregate assessed value of less than one thousand
dollars. Defendants were "two great mining and manufacturing enter-
prises" worth nearly two million dollars, representing half of the tax-
able values in the county.6 0 Defendants reduced their copper ore by
cooking it over open-air wood fires, emitting large volumes of sulphur
dioxide smoke, and turning the valley into a wasteland. The Tennessee
court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief because
"the law must make the best arrangement it can between the con-
tending parties, with a view to preserving to each one the largest mea-
sure of liberty possible under the circumstances." 61 "Liberty" here
meant that the companies were free to create a wasteland if they paid
for it, whereas the farmers were free to take jobs with the industry and
continue to reside in a valley totally polluted with chemicals.
Counterpoint to this balancing of the interests is Whalen v. Union
Bag & Paper Co.,62 which involved a farm situated beside a creek in
Saratoga County. Defendant built a pulp mill a few miles upstream,
investing more than a million dollars and providing jobs for between
four and five hundred people. Discharges from the mill polluted the
creeks and a lawsuit resulted. The trial judge granted plaintiff an in-
junction to take effect one year later and awarded damages. The ap-
pellate division, impressed with the argument that the mill would have
to close down to comply with the court's decision, reversed the injunc-
tion order and reduced the damages to one hundred dollars a year.
The Court of Appeals, however, reinstated the injunction, announcing
58 Id. §§ 822(d)(i), 826, 828.
59 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
60 Id. at 343, 366, 83 S.W. at 660, 666-67.
61 Id. at 367, 83 S.W. at 667.
62 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
68 It is somewhat ironic that pulp mills requiring immense quantities of dean
water in their operations should face the most serious problems of stream pol-
lution. The sulphite process, using an add digestion of wood chips in pressure
vessels with a solution of calcium and magnesium acid sulfites, produces about
equal amounts of pulp and waste.... An average sulfite process pulp mill turns
out about 100 tons of pulp daily, and that means the sulfite waste liquor from
the process contains another hundred tons of solid material in dilute solution
that must be disposed of. This product seriously contaminates any streams into
which it is dumped, and only those streams having extraordinarily high flow can
accept this amount of contaminant without serious damage to the stream, its
fish population, and the subsequent use of the water of the stream.
Killeffer, Packaging Pollution, SATuRDAY Rv., March 2, 1968, at 55.
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a ringing repudiation of any effort at balancing interests because, "if
followed to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of
his little property by giving it to those already rich."64 Seemingly,
therefore, New York and Tennessee came to opposite results, with the
little man triumphant in New York.
The victory of a yeoman farmer in Saratoga County brings to
mind McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 65 in which a homeowner
obtained an injunction forbidding a manufacturer's use of soft coal.
The court took pains to point out that this case came up from a "coun-
try district suitable for country homes." 66 Still, one must read in pari
materia with Whalen and McCarty the revealing case of Bove v. Don-
ner-Hanna Coke Corp.,67 where the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought re-
lief from the dirt cascading onto her house from a coke plant.
It is true that the appellant was a resident of this locality for
several years before the defendant came on the scene of action, and
that, when the plaintiff built her house, the land on which these
coke ovens now stand was a hickory grove. But in a growing com-
munity changes are inevitable. This region was never fitted for a
residential district; for years it has been peculiarly adapted for fac-
tory sites. This was apparent when plaintiff bought her lots and
when she built her house. The land is low and lies adjacent to the
Buffalo River, a navigable stream connecting with Lake Erie. Seven
different railroads run through this area. Freight tracks and yards
can be seen in every direction. Railroads naturally follow the low
levels in passing through a city. Cheap transportation is an attrac-
tion which always draws factories and industrial plants to a locality.
It is common knowledge that a combination of rail and water
terminal facilities will stamp a section as a site suitable for indus-
tries of the heavier type, rather than for residential purposes.68
The moral drawn by the court was elementary: "One who chooses to
live in the large centers of population cannot expect the quiet of the
country." 69
There is a difference, then, between the peace and quiet of Sara-
64 208 N.Y. at 5, 101 N.E. at 806.
65 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907).
66 Id. at 44, 81 N.E. at 549.
67 286 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (4th Dep't 1932).
68 Id. at 41, 258 N.Y.S. at 233-34.
69 Id. at 40, 258 N.Y.S. at 232. The court, it should be observed, gave as "another
reason" for denying relief the fact that the area had been zoned to allow coke ovens. Id.
at 43, 258 N.Y.S. at 235. New York, of course, is said to follow "the minority view which
refuses injunctive relief if the use is permitted by a zoning ordinance." Note, Zoning
Ordinances and Common-Law Nuisance, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 860, 861 (1965). But see id.
at 864-65; Jones v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 273 App. Div. 510, 77 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Ist Dep't 1948).
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toga County and a site "suitable for country homes" on the one hand,
and a poor farming region in Tennessee and the Buffalo flats on the
other. Thus, there is a great deal of truth to the proposition that nui-
sance cases are a species of "judicial zoning . . . carried out on a
sporadic, hit-or-miss basis." 70 In the words of the progenitors of this
thesis, the recent cases "clearly demonstrate a definite increase in judi-
cial sensitivity to the 'character of the neighborhood."'71 Nuisance is
a form of land-use control, but the sensitivity of the judges remains to
be seen.
In Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc.,72 plaintiff-home-
owner sought to enjoin the creation of dust by defendant's plant. Plain-
tiff had resided in Concrete since 1907, had purchased his house in
1934, and had lived in it until 1938 when he began to rent it. The
cement plant had been in town since 1908. Indeed, it appears that the
town grew because of the plant, and that the local economy was de-
pendent on it. The installation of newly devised dust-catching ma-
chinery would have alleviated the problem, but the costs would have
been enormous, requiring total reconstruction of the plant. The trial
court refused plaintiff an injunction, but awarded him five hundred
dollars damages. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the award
of damages lest the principle established thereby "encourage litigation
which would unreasonably harass industry .. . which it is the policy
of the law to protect within reason."73
Ten years later, the same court decided Riblet v. Spokane-Port-
land Cement Co.74 This time plaintiffs sued to recover for damage to
their residential property caused by cement dust. Here, however, the
supreme court reversed the trial judge who relied on Powell, and an-
nounced modestly that "rights as to the usage of land are relative" 75
and that the "crux of the matter appears to be reasonableness."78 Again
the company had arrived in 1910, the town had grown around the
plant, and the plaintiffs had arrived later. This time, however, plain-
tiff's property was located on a plateau some three thousand feet away,
and perhaps significantly, plaintiff's husband was an official of a tram-
70 J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 292 (1962).
71 Beuscher &: Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis.
L. RFv. 440, 443.
72 15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
73 Id. at 21, 129 P.2d at 540.
74 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952).
75 Id. at 254, 248 P.2d at 382.
76 Id. at 254, 248 P.2d at 382.
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way construction company and an investor. Illustrative of their inde-
pendent suburban status, moreover, were the facts that plaintiffs owned
a vista house, a garage, a swimming pool, a croquet court which could
be flooded in the winter to serve as a skating rink, and an outdoor
checkerboard with giant-sized checkers. On these facts, the high court
found the case distinguishable from Powell. The neighborhood, after
all, was not devoted solely to industrial activity, "that is, the production
of cement." 77
It seems fairly safe to assert that a suburban dream house has be-
come part of the contemporary concept of utopia, which makes all the
more interesting the Riblets' testimony that their home was "the
culmination of their dreams."78 As a tentative hypothesis, therefore,
the nuisance cases thus far examined can all be organized around the
rule that a home in a suitable suburban locale has become sacrosanct
in American thought. Inhabitants of areas adaptable to "country-style
living" merit protection against the inroads of tranquility-upsetting
industrialization. The poor dirt farmer and the city dweller, however,
must grin and bear it amidst the grime and stench of "progress."
There is more to this than drug store cynicism, however, as further
reflection will reveal. As we have already seen, although answers to
elementary questions pertaining to overhanging balconies come hard,
solutions to broader social questions, such as the disposition of losses
attributable to accidents, flow readily. Similarly, an effort to reduce
to hornbook-style symmetry the various catch-phrase sophistries uttered
by judges handling nuisance cases would promise the serious scholar a
lifetime's exercise in futility.7 9 Yet, behind the "vague, scrambled and
flexible body of doctrine" 80 lies the process of adjusting discordant
land uses. Once we admit that the judges are engineering harmony,
however, we should not be surprised to discover that a canon of can't-
helps serves to adumbrate the ideal of harmonious land-use. Just as the
fault-centered ideology of the nineteenth century channeled the judges'
stumbling efforts to crystallize the legal norm around the fundamental
tenet of fault, today's judges organize the law of nuisance around con-
temporary conventional wisdom, elevating suburbia to a central posi-
tion in our post fault-oriented ideology of the American way of life.
77 Id. at 255, 248 P.2d at 383.
78 Id. at 251, 248 P.2d at 381.
79 The reader need only peruse the cases collected in his own state's digest, e.g.,
Nuisances, 42 N.Y. Jtus. 441-533 (1965).
80 Beuscher & Morrison, supra note 71, at 443.
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III
THE SUBURBAN SYNDROME
A. Creating Suburbia Through Zoning-The New Jersey Method
Even a cursory reading of the Standard Enabling Act reveals that
zoning should be done "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."8'
The true nature of this comprehensive plan is the subject of no little
controversy. A "zoning expert" once testified in response to a direct
question as to what constitutes a comprehensive plan:
The plan itself is the map you see, is the ordinance that must
be analyzed is conjunction with the map, and it is something which
anybody looking at it would have to determine as to whether there
is mutual consistency in what has been put on that map in terms of
whether there is a reasonable direction that the community takes.
In other words, a community has shown its hand as to what it be-
lieves a reasonable direction of the various uses of land is.
Q. Is it your testimony, then, that the comprehensive plan as you
understand it is that plan as represented by the zoning map and
by the zoning ordinance?
A. In essence, that is what it is.
Q. Either it is or it is not.
A. It is.
Q. Are there any other elements to it other than the map and the
zoning ordinance?
A. I don't think so.s2
Thus, just as the medium became the message, the zoning ordinance
and map are their own comprehensive plan by which they are judged.
Professor Haar expressed regret that the legislative failure to
equate comprehensive plan with master plan has created the problem
of assigning an appropriate meaning to the term "comprehensive
plan." He concludes that the courts see the requirement of a compre-
81 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3, in A. RATx-
KOPF & C. PATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 547-51 (2d ed. 1949).
82 Levine v. Town of Oyster Bay, 46 Misc. 2d 106, 112-13, 259 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254
(Sup. Ct. 1964). See also Udell v. McFadyen, 40 Misc. 2d 265, 267, 243 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159
(Sup. Ct. 1963):
The only zoning case found in which conformance to a master plan has been
considered is Matter of Fornaby v. Feriola, 18 A.D.2d 215, 239 N.Y.S.2d 185, in
which the ordinance specifically provided that "use shall not conflict with the
direction of business development in accordance with any Master Plan." Most
New York cases concerned with the meaning of the phrase have dealt with spot
zoning and, while adopting no clear definition, have analyzed the ordinance and
the fact situation presented in terms of consistency and rationality.
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
hensive plan as the equivalent of a constitutional directive for zoning
authorities to refrain from arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious be-
havior. Since, however, an exterior set of values with which to judge
the zoning authorities' behavior is absent, and since the zoning ordi-
nance and map mesh into a consistent and rational pattern, the courts
end up holding that the comprehensive plan is the map itself. Haar sees
a danger that zoning "considered as a self-contained activity rather
than as a means to a broader end, may tyrannize individual property
owners."s3 Professor Reps recently added that this "circular reasoning
will prevail until new legislation changes the rules of the judicial
game." 84
A number of communities, however, recognize that the zoning
map is not simply a tracing of the existent land-use situation onto a
map having the force of law for the purpose of stabilizing property
values. They see quite clearly that the map can fix a community's
future environment by regulating the users who henceforth will be let
into the community. Thus, they see zoning as a useful tool for coercing
community development along country-style, suburban utopia lines. A
series of New Jersey cases illustrates the dynamics of the suburban
syndrome at work, a phenomenon wrought with its own peculiar irony,
since the New Jersey courts insist that "[z]oning and planning are not
identical in concept. '"83
Wayne Township, located in Passaic County just outside of New-
ark and New York City, covered roughly 25 square miles compared to
Newark's 23.5. In 1952, its 12,000 residents were dwarfed by Newark's
438,000. Whereas Newark was a crowded urban center, only twelve
percent of the land area in Wayne was improved. Bordering on several
lakes, it contained little business or industry. Its residences varied from
modest $10,000 homes to $75,000 estates. Faced with developers build-
ing small houses on the lake, the town fixed minimum bulk require-
ments that set a practical minimum cost of $12,000 on future homes.
The planned result, of course, limited future buyers to respectable
income brackets, and perhaps upzoned the township status-wise. The
political validity of this purpose was unclear, however, since the move
was argued in court in terms of the reasonableness of legislation de-
signed to better the health and safety of the citizenry. In Lionshead
83 Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. Rav. 1154, 1158
(1955).
84 Reps, Pomeroy Memorial Lecture: Requiem for Zoning, in C. BERGER, LAND OWN-
FSHIp AND UsE 823, 828 (1968).
85 Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117, 129, 128 A.2d 473, 480 (1957);
Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township,86 the New Jersey high court sustained
the ordinance notwithstanding a vigorous dissenter who suggested that
this was class legislation running afoul of "the fundamental principles
of our form of government."8' 7
The next town to set about excluding the overflow mob from a
nearby metropolis was Bedminster Township, situated to the west of
Newark. Able to trace its history back to a royal charter in 1749, it was
superbly suited to country-style living with its "rolling countryside
divided into a naturally wooded area, farms and country establish-
ments. ' 88 Although "only 40 miles from New York, [Bedminster] is
as essentially rural as if it were 400 miles away .... "89 Somewhat larger
in area than Newark, it had a population of 1,613 as opposed to New-
ark's 438,000. At stake this time was the validity of the five-acre mini-
mum lot requirement in its residential area zoning plan. Again taking
into account the rural conditions prevailing in the township, the court
found nothing unreasonable in an ordinance designed "to preserve the
countryside for its best use." 90
In 1955 the court sustained a Palisades Park supplemental ordi-
nance excluding motels from a residential community just across the
George Washington Bridge from New York City.91
The environmental characteristics of many of our beautiful
residential communities are such that the establishment and opera-
tion of motels therein would be highly incongruous and would
seriously impair existing property values.92
Although the dissenters could see restricting motels to certain parts of
the community, they did not see how total exclusion could be anything
but unreasonable. To them, apparently, zoning involved the classifica-
tion of use-districts so that various activities could go on in different
parts of town without harming property values; it did not involve plan-
ning the intangible environment of the community. Thus, the dis-
senters still believed that zoning and planning were distinct activities.
86 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
87 Id. at 181, 89 A.2d at 701. For a biting criticism of the result, see Haar, Zoning for
Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1051 (1953). What
most upset Professor Haar was the fact that the court spoke in glowing terms of the
need to protect the health of children and the benefits of expansive living-space. "The
New Jersey court substituted shibboleths for reasoning, and used liberal shibboleths to
attain an illiberal result ...." Id. at 1063.
88 Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 197, 93 A.2d 378, 379 (1952).
89 Id. at 198, 93 A.2d at 380.
90 Id. at 204, 93 A.2d at 383.
91 Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955).
92 Id. at 30, 118 A.2d at 408.
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The crunch finally came with the decision involving Gloucester
Township.98 This twenty-three square mile community in Camden
County was feeling the effects of overflow from Camden and Philadel-
phia. Its population had grown from 7,950 in 1950 to about 17,500 in
1960, and its 2,694 houses of 1955 had become 4,113 in 1959. Even so,
the bulk of the township remained undeveloped. In an industrial dis-
trict south of the growing residential area, a developer's desire to open
a trailer camp led the township to amend its map to exclude trailer
camps entirely. Again the court sustained the ordinance, waxing elo-
quent over the wonders of planning as a preservative of country-style
living. First, it noted, "It is clear the tide of suburban development
has begun to engulf the rustic character of the township."94 Second,
it pointed out that in its industrial district the township did not en-
visage factories but instead "areas resembling parks where nuisance
type plants are excluded and attractive architecture prevails."9 5 Finally,
it unleashed a fusillade of polite pejoratives against trailer camps. The
stage was then set for the court to reaffirm its belief in planning:
In the present case the township is seeking to create an attrac-
tive industrial zone. The purpose of the zoning ordinance is to guide
the township in its transition from a laissez faire growth to a well-
ordered community. The zoning ordinance does not presently en-
vision exclusively industrial districts since it permits dwellings to
be erected in those areas. However, these houses can only by one-
family detached dwellings on a lot not less than 75 by 125 feet. The
governing body determined that such houses would be compatible
with industrial uses. It thought that trailer camps would strike a
discordant note and be detrimental to property values, present and
prospective, and retard the progress of the township. The govern-
ing body stated "a trailer camp is not attractive in appearance" and
considered this factor in reaching their conclusion. Aesthetics may
properly be considered in establishing a zoning scheme .... 96
Perforce, the plan was reasonable and, naturally enough, valid.
Thus far, the New Jersey court seems to have taken the Garden
State idea seriously by giving its suburban communities considerable
latitude to use zoning as a planning device to maintain a Walden-like
idyll. However, whether the court is really as enamored of planning
per se as it is of the idea of neat middle-class suburban townships not
bothered by motels, tiny houses, or trailer parks remains doubtful. A
93 Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
94 Id. at 245, 181 A.2d at 136.
95 Id. at 246, 181 A.2d at 186.
98 Id. at 247-48, 181 A.2d at 137.
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final case may shed light on this. In Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster,97
the same court, which thought so highly of pleasant industrial parks
uninhibited by trailer camps, struck down, at the behest of a shopping-
center promoter, an ordinance zoning an area exclusively for industrial
park use. Furthermore, as the dissent took pains to point out, the
majority failed to invoke the litany in behalf of planning but, instead,
reverted momentarily to the idea that zoning simply involves dividing
a municipality into compatible use-districts0
B. Suburbia Triumphant
Every student of property lore recalls the case of Hadacheck v.
Sebastian,99 wherein the Supreme Court of the United States sustained
the closing of a brick manufacturing enterprise as a public nuisance.
Tradition has it that this decision provided reformers with the courage
to believe that zoning would survive the test of constitutionality.1°°
However, zoning enthusiasts had to be careful to advise businessmen
that if they became nonconforming users, they would not suffer the
same fate. 101 But the ghost of Hadacheck still walks the land, as a recent
New York cause c6l~bre illustrates.
A businessman purchased a parcel of land in the Town of Hemp-
stead, Long Island, in 1927 when the area was primarily dedicated to
farming. By 1960, however, the parcel was surrounded by residences.
More than 2,200 homes and four schools with a total enrollment of
4,500 children were within a radius of 3,500 feet. The businessman's
son thus found himself owning a thirty-eight acre parcel in the midst
of a wholly new environment. The difficulty arose because the parcel
was exploited as a gravel pit, and constant excavation had created a
twenty-acre lake some twenty-five feet deep. Although the town zoned
the area residential, the dredging went on as a nonconforming use.
In fact, an effort to force the cessation of dredging as a violation of
97 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955).
98 Id. at 133, 118 A.2d at 834.
99 239 U.S. 394 (1915). For a quick refresher on this case see B. PooLEY, PLANNING
AND ZONING IN THE UNTED STATES 42-43 (1961).
100 E.g., B. PooLEY, supra note 99, at 43.
101 E. BAss=r, ZONING 113 (1940):
During the preparatory work for the zoning of Greater New York fears were
constantly expressed by property owners that existing nonconforming buildings
would be ousted. The demand was general that this should not be done. The
Zoning Commission went as far as it could to explain that existing noncon-
forming uses could continue, that zoning looked to the future, and that if order-
liness could be brought about in the future the nonconforming buildings would
to a considerable extent be changed by natural causes as time went on.
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the residential zoning requirement proved abortive. In 1958, however,
the town enacted an ordinance prohibiting further underwater excava-
tions and requiring existing excavations to be backfilled. Indeed, the
ordinance made noncompliance a new misdemeanor every week. The
new ordinance, of course, put the gravel pit out of business.
How did the courts react? When the town sought to enjoin further
operations, the Court of Appeals sustained the measure as an exercise
of the police power for the public safety. The end, after all, was safety,
and the "hazards ... of these pits are common knowledge. "102 Given
a proper end, the only question was whether the means were appropri-
ate. The answer was elementary, however, because "[i]t is not the func-
tion of the courts but of legislators to determine the 'reasonableness,
wisdom, and propriety' of regulations needed to protect the com-
munity.' 0 3 In Washington, moreover, the businessman fared no better,
because the Supreme Court decided that the appellant had not met
the burden of proving the ordinance unreasonable. 10 4
In the Court of Appeals, Judge Van Voorhis had dissented on the
ground that "the record here indicates a systematic attempt to force the
plaintiffs out of business.' 0 5 Motive, however, is said to be irrelevant
in these cases. An earlier New York case had involved a town suddenly
interested in removing clotheslines from front yards after an irate tax-
payer hung out dirty linen as a protest measure. There the Court of
Appeals had been quite frank about motive:
It is a fair inference that adoption of the ordinance before us
was prompted by the conduct and action of the defendants but we
deem it clear that, if the law would otherwise be held constitutional,
it will not be stricken as discriminatory or invalid because of its
motivation.106
Thus, old activities marring the new suburban scene can be eliminated
if they are, for example, a danger to children. The paradox, of course,
is that the sand and gravel excavated from this pit probably served as the
foundation of the houses around it, and thus the pit served to hasten
its own end. Like Maeterlinck's bee, it had served its purpose.
102 Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 9 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 172 N.E.2d 562, 563-64, 211
N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (1961).
103 Id. at 105, 172 N.E.2d at 564, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
104 Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
105 9 N.Y.2d at 107, 172 N.E.2d at 565, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
106 People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 191 N.E.2d 272, 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 736
(1963). Cf. Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 368, 207 N.E.2d 181, 183, 259 N.Y.S.2d
129, 132 (1965), where the court did cite motive in striking down legislation as unconsti-
tutional.
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C. The Quality of Suburbia
The possibility of exploiting zoning machinery to plan the char-
acter of communities did not escape the attention of suburbanites. 0 7
The behavior of the New Jersey judges illustrates, moreover, that
pluralism is not an American value, since their decisions justify sub
silento the erection of a class wall shutting out the less affluent from
suburbia. Even the New York judges, oftentimes trigger happy when
it comes to vested property rights, 08 seemed remarkably casual about
writing off a man's business under the guise of protecting the public
safety. Together, these judges represent a judicial imprimatur on the
local policy of restricting future immigration into suburbia and con-
verting the countryside into the image of the suburban dream. What
is the attraction in the dream which causes such compulsive conduct?
Descriptions of the suburban scene hardly explain its magnetism.
Max Lerner has told us:
Suburban America was mainly middle-class America....
So the would-be suburbanite picked his plot and his house type
and got his homeowners' loan, and made a down payment. He
moved his belongings to a row of Cape Cod or "ranch-type" or
"split-level" houses. His wife furnished it to look like the layouts in
House Beautiful and she shopped in supermarkets, highway stores,
and shopping centers where she could park and get everything at
once. She filled the house with the latest kitchen appliances, and
there was a TV set in the living room. There were rows of middle-
priced sedans and hard-top convertibles lining the block which
were as interchangeable and standardized as the houses, deep-
freezes, TV sets, magazines, processed foods, and permanent waves
that a community survey would reveal ....
As a way of life it defied all the traditional claptrap about
American individualism. It was largely standardized and to a sur-
prising degree collectivized .... 109
107 "Indeed, if planning is intended to achieve ... some unstated or whispered social
and political objectives, zoning has been far more effective than its originators dared ex-
pect." R. BABcocK, TiE ZONiNG GAME 123 (1966).
108 E.g., Heyert v. Orange g- Rockland Util., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263, 271
N.Y.S.2d 201 (1966); Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 297 N.E.2d 181, 295 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1965). Compare the opinions of Judge Van Voorhis in Whitmier & Ferris Co. v. New
York, 20 N.Y.2d 413, 230 N.E.2d 904, 284 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1967) and People v. Stover, 12
N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
109 M. LaNER, AMmICA AS A CIVILIZATION 176-77 (1957). For a more sympathetic
view of suburbia, however, see H. GANS, THE LEVrroWNERS (1967). But cf. id. at 417:
The strengths and weaknesses of Levittown are those of many American com-
munities, and the Levittowners closely resemble other young middle class Amer-
icans. They are not America, for they are not a numerical majority in the
population, but they represent the major constituency of the largest and most
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Unattractive as it may sound, there is a compulsion to move to sub-
urbia. This can only be understood with the realization that a home
there, notwithstanding the dreary alikeness of it all, is a status symbol
in our society. If this is true, the "choice" to go to suburbia is illusory,
since success demands it, and conversely, the very integrity of the sym-
bol requires that the less successful be excluded. In short, America is a
class society.
The impact of suburbia is being felt most directly upon the land
itself. Developers want to improve flat land in order to keep costs down,
but the flat lands today are the only economically viable farm lands.110
At [the existing] rate of rural land conversion, the nation could
be faced eventually with a shortage of many food commodities that
are presently being exported. By the year 2000 it has been estimated
that at least 100,000,000 acres of our flattest and originally most
fertile land will have been converted into urban uses. Once land is
reduced to small disconnected plots in an urban development, it is
no longer valuable for modern machine agriculture."'
Agriculture, therefore, must be adjusted to ever more efficient methods
of cultivating the remaining space. It is not inconceivable that in the
future only those foods susceptible to total machine farming will be
available. 12 Quite unwittingly, the new country-style-living middle
classes may be undermining the very foundation of their gourmet pre-
tensions.
The quality of suburban life is subject to question. The sub-
urbanites in New Jersey, for example, once drew their water from wells
powerful economic and political institutions in American society-the favored
customers and voters whom these seek to attract and satisfy.
11o Allee, American Agriculture-Its Resource Issues for the Coming Years, DAEDALus
1071, 1077 (1967): "The new agricultural technology is not equally applicable to all land
resources.... Mechanized equipment is of more advantage to flatter, larger fields than
to smaller, steeper fields."
Ill Gould, Urban Sprawl and Its Spatial Implications, 9 CUaa. MUN. PROB. 219, 221-
22 (1967). See also J. GOTTMANN, MEGAos'oLs 321-22 (1961):
A number of agricultural conservationists and some farmers are alarmed at
the rate at which farmlands are disappearing. They take a long view of the
nation's food supply and recognize that our present surpluses are an anomaly in
what is more generally a hungry, undernourished world. ... With growth of
population the per-capita area of arable earth would shrink even without the
loss of a single farm.
112 See, e.g., TiME, Aug. 18, 1967, at 78-83. There is an interesting problem in juris-
prudence here, because as the farmer becomes increasingly dependent upon expensive and
exotic machinery, presumably purchased on credit, the question will arise whether he is
a yeoman farmer in debt, or whether farming is done by the equipment manufacturers
using tenant farmers, the tenancy in this instance being disguised by the fact that the
relationship is determined by the chattel security agreement.
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at a rate ten percent greater than the land's average yield. 13 Septic
tank systems dispose of sewage on plots of one acre, but a fascinating
percolation problem presents itself when the system is used on lots
measuring a scant 60 x 135 feet.114 But should the suburbanite escape
both drought and disease, he must participate in the daily ritual of the
trip into center-city to work. The notion that every workday sees the
migration of 1,600,000 persons onto Manhattan, there to crowd to-
gether in a density of 180,000 persons per square mile,"1 5 staggers the
imagination. This spectacle of the madding crowd seems more remi-
niscent of a teeming and frantic Asian city than of the television stereo-
type of the well adjusted and self-contained hamlets inhabited by the
likes of Patty Duke. 16
Yet, the choice" 7 to live in suburbia would be of private concern,
except for the impact the exodus has had upon center-city. The city is
well on its way to becoming a haven for the rich and a terminal for
the poor." 8 Worse, it is being remodeled to suit the desires of the
113 R. Dickinson, The Process of Urbanization, in FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH
AMERICA 463, 471 (1966). See also J. GOTrMANN, supra note 111, at 729-35.
114 See authorities cited note 113 supra.
115 J. GOITMANN, supra note 111, at S0 (based on the 1950 census). Those contem-
plating the situation might do worse than to read T. S. Eliot, The Wasteland, in THE
COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYs 39 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. ed. 1952):
A Crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
I had not thought death had undone so many ....
or, from the same:
A rat crept softly through the vegetation
Dragging its slimy belly on the bank
While I was fishing in the dull canal
On a winter evening round behind the gashouse.
Id. at 43. Or, perhaps, the lines from The Hollow Men:
This is the dead land
This is cactus land
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a dead man's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.
Id. at 57.
116 S. Farber, Quality of Living-Stress and Creativity, in FuruRE ENVIRONMENTS OF
NORTH AMERICA 342, 344 (F. Darling & J. Milton eds. 1966):
But the editor was surprised to find that his most stressful time of day was not at
work.
His most stressful activity, as indicated by the peaks in his pulse rate, was
commuting to and from his suburban home. His pulse rate was regularly higher
while driving on the crowded highway than it was when the presses broke down
or the front page had been reset just before deadline because of a new crisis in
Berlin.
117 Apparently 90% of Americans believe that it is best to own their own single-
family unit. S. GREER, URBAN RENEwAL AND A~mCAN CrriEs 134 & n.10 (1965).
118 "Increasingly since 1945, middle-income families with children have been de-
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middle class. Urban renewal, under the guise of providing housing,
has been exploited to create vast cultural centers like Lincoln Center,
in keeping with the status needs of the middle class." 9 It has also been
exploited to construct luxury high-rises in keeping with the tastes for
cosmopolitan living of the older middle class after they have weaned
their litter.120 In the process, however, it is the poor who have paid the
price of satisfying these desires by being crowded into shoddy
housing.121
D. Suburbia's Hidden Purpose
For most, the decision whether to purchase or to rent turns ini-
tially upon the availability of mortgage credit. Even if mortgage money
is available, however, the decision to purchase hinges on the amount
of the downpayment required, and the size of the monthly payments
thereafter. Since the decision turns upon these several factors, it should
be apparent that "control over the supply of mortgage funds, the length
of time allowed for repayment, and the rate of interest charged become
powerful tools for deciding how much housing will be made available
and to whom.' 22 To increase the number of potential home-buyers,
therefore, it is necessary to stimulate the agglutinization of funds avail-
parting for the suburbs; lower-income groups including substantial numbers of racial
minorities, have taken up the slack." COMM. FOR ECON. DEy., GUIDING METROPOLITAN
GROWTH 18 (Aug. 1960). "Between 1960 and 1970, an estimated 10,000,000 farmers will
have moved to the city. The majority of these migrants-white and black-are the poor,
the underprivileged, the uneducated." Gavin & Hadley, The Crisis of the Cities: The
Battle We Can Win, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 24, 1968, at 30, 31.
119 "But there is still no shopping center or cultural center in Bedford-Stuyvesant, an
area containing some 400,000 people." Gavin & Hadley, supra note 118, at 32.
120 Two thirds of Washington's white population are over forty. Grier, The Negro
Ghettos and Federal Housing Policy, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 550, 552 (1967). See also,
Whalen, A City Destroying Itself, FORTUNE, Sept. 1964, at 234: "Almost all families who
can afford it, except the very rich, reject New York City as a place to bring up children."
121 M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER 67 (1964).
What is important is the direction in which the federal urban renewal program
has been operating. It has worsened the situation that it set out to solve by re-
ducing the number of homes available to those people who don't have much
money to spend and by expanding the choice for those who can afford to spend
more.
See also Nolan, A Belated Effort to Save Our Cities, THE REPORTER, Dec. 28, 1967, at 16:
Each new urban renewal program has been designed essentially as an andidote,
not a cure . . . . [The Model Cities program attempts to humanize urban re-
newal, which had too often erected luxury apartments or office towers without
improving the housing of the poor people it displaced.
S. GRER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES 3 (1965):
At a cost of more than three billion dollars the Urban Renewal Agency (URA)
has succeeded in materially reducing the supply of low-cost housing in American
cities.
122 C. HAAR, FEDERAL CREDIT AND PRIVATE HOUSING 9 (1960).
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able for loans, to encourage the lender to advance as near to one-
hundred percent of the purchase price as possible, to spread out as long
as possible the repayment period of the loan, and, at the same time, to
keep interest charges within reason.123
The National Housing Act of 1934124 "made available to lenders
home mortgage loans that, in the event of default and foreclosure, were
exchangeable for Government-guaranteed bonds or cash." 125 Thus, the
banks were encouraged to regard mortgage loans as safe investments.226
Lest the banks be inhibited by the trauma of getting caught again with
a portfolio of loans due in full on "law day"'- at the perigee of another
boom-bust cycle, this insurance was limited to amortized loans, a fact
which led to the overhaul of the whole mortgage-lending machinery.32 8
Furthermore, to satisfy the need for cash reserves to stem a short-run
recession, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was
created to purchase qualified mortgages. 29 Not only did FNMA prom-
123 Id. at 10: "For example, on a twenty-five-year mortgage an increase in the interest
rate from 4 to 5 percent raises monthly debt service by over 10 percent." Hearings on
FHA and FNMA in the Current Money Market before the Subcomm. on Housing of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966):
[I]f interest rates go up 1 percent, the family who buys a $20,000 home will pay
more than $4,700 in additional interest over the life of a 30-year loan. With
median incomes at about $4,600, this means that millions of people have to con-
tribute a year's wages to just pay the extra interest.
124 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1964).
125 COMM'N ON MONEY AND CREDrT, THE COmMaFRacuL BANKING INDUsTRY 219 (1962).
See National Housing Act § 203, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1964).
126 COMM'N ON MONEY AND CREDIT, supra note 125, at 219:
With a sustained flow of amortization receipts providing a substantial degree of
flexibility to lending institutions, and with the development of a secondary
market for government-underwritten mortgages imparting a measure of liquidity
to such loans as well, the attractiveness of home mortgages to commercial banks
was greatly enhanced.
C. HAAR, supra note 122, at 16: "[G]overnment-insured mortgages, unlike the conventional
type of mortgage, more nearly meet these liquidity requirements (especially in the days
of FNMA support) .... "
127 E.g., A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY 678-79 (1951).
128 COMAt'N ON MONEY AND C.EDrr, supra note 125, at 219.
129 C. HA"g, supra note 122, at 25:
FNMA provides a secondary mortgage market for the purchase, service, and
sale of certain types of FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mortgages. Originally
chartered by the Federal Housing Administration on February 10, 1938, as a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, it was given
a statutory charter on July 1, 1948. The next step ... occurred on September 7,
1950, when the Association was transferred to HHFA, under Reorganization Plan
No. 22 of 1950. Under the Housing Act of 1954 (Title III of the National Housing
Act) FNMA was rechartered and designated a constituent agency of HHFA.
Let Dwight Ink, Assistant Secretary for Administration, Dep't of Housing and Urban
Dev. continue the story:
When Robert C. Weaver was sworn into office on January 18, 1966, as the
nation's first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), he undertook
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ise liquidity, it could also provide more funds for a stagnant mortgage
market by the simple expedient of purchasing mortgages at a dis-
count. 30 In substance, the federal government sought to make mort-
gage loans attractive in order to get the economy moving again.' 31
Since World War II the increasing interest of life insurance com-
panies132 in mortgages originated and serviced by mortgage placement
companies13 3 has provided another vast reservoir of mortgage money.
the most ambitious and dramatic revamping attempted by any cabinet depart-
ment in recent years.
The Act transferred intact to the new department the former agency's mixed-
ownership corporation, the Federal National Mortgage Association, with the Sec-
retary as chairman of its board of directors. [§ 5(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3534(b) (Supp.
11, 1965-66)].
Ink, The Department of Housing and Urban Development-Building a New Federal De-
partment, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 375 (1967).
180 E.g., "When authorized by the President, FNMA can purchase insured or guar-
anteed mortgages for the purpose of retarding a decline in lending and building activities
which threatens the stability of a high-level national economy." C. HAAR, supra note 122,
at 25.
131 COMM'N ON MONEY AND CREorr, supra note 125, at 219; Professor Haar has com-
mented:
With the onset of the great Depression, however, the weakness of the real
estate market seemed beyond the ability of the states to correct. In the home-
building field, eyes turned quickly toward the only source, at that time, of funds
and initiative, the Federal government; and the Federal government exploited
this invitation to launch its own policy for housing and land, mainly through the
use of credit.
C. HAAR, supra note 122, at 7 (footnote omitted).
132 S. KLAMAN, THE POSTWAR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET 8 (1961):
The relatively slow pickup of the mortgage investments by life insurance
companies was due in part to the cautious attitude of some companies remem-
bering the experience of the thirties and in part to the problems of market re-
organization. It was necessary to re-establish mortgage correspondent or branch
office organizations, largely dismantled after many years of reduced mortgage
activity during depression and war. As these problems were solved and skepti-
cism toward mortgages faded, life insurance companies devoted a steadily rising
share of assets to mortgages. Except for the first two years after the war, when
commercial banks took the lead in mortgage lending, the net flow of funds from
life insurance companies exceeded the flow from any other type of investor
through 1951.
See also, W. Goldsmith, Introduction to S. KLAMAN, Id. at xxii:
The first of the basic tendencies exemplified by developments in the residen-
tial mortgage market during the postwar period is its institutionalization. At the
end of 1956 nearly 90 percent of all outstanding residential mortgages were held
by financial institutions ....
The second characteristic [of] the market for residential mortgages [is] . . .
the large-scale adoption of government guaranteed mortgages. This process in-
volved the use of legal and technical forms and of facilitating government agen-
cies which were created as part of the far-reaching reconstruction of American
finance under the New Deal-a development that is still often underrated in its
long-term significance.
133 S. KLAmAm, supra note 132, at 20:
Mortgage companies originate and service mortgage loans for the accounts of
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The title insurance industry has grown concomitantly, providing a
guarantee for mortgages generated by on-the-spot mortgage companies
so that they can be sold to distant insurance companies 34 Indeed, the
only thing lacking to complete the picture is a true secondary market 135
in which mortgages are bought and sold like any other security.13 6
The FHA insurance scheme was continued in the Housing Act of
1949.137 The motive this time was not to stimulate a depressed econ-
omy, but to "provide a decent home and suitable living environment
for every American family."'138 Rhetoric aside, however, the legislation
was designed not only to meet the demands of returning veterans for
decent housing, but to create a new stimulus for the economy lest a
postwar recession occur. The use of federal credit as a device to in-
vigorate the economy was becoming commonplace, but there also ap-
pears a coordinate objective. Indeed, FHA and FNMA stimulation of
institutional investors, not for their own portfolios, and usually engage in one or
more related real estate activities. Relative to their volume of business, mortgage
companies have a very small capital investment. Their phenomenal growth is
directly connected with the introduction of the federal mortgage underwriting
program and its reduction of geographic barriers to mortgage investment. It
also stems from decisions by most life insurance companies to acquire out-of-
state mortgages through locally owned independent companies rather than
through their own branch offices or subsidiaries.
See id. ch. 8.
134 Roberts, Urban Conveyancing Techniques in America: The Story Behind Title
Insurance, 27 CONy. & PROP. LAw 240, 247 (1963):
Life insurance in United States is also big business, generating huge aggre-
gates of capital which must be invested .... Thus, there was a supply of money
available to meet the demand if the life companies could be assured that their
liens upon property would be secure. But a life company, centered in Hartford,
Connecticut, for example, could not be expected to run its own searches in
Philadelphia and Los Angeles. Further, it could hardly familiarise itself with
the Bar everywhere so that it would know whose reports were reliable. A device
had to be found which would enable mortgages to become freely negotiable on
the national scene.
It was title insurance which provided the device.
See also, Roberts, Title Insurance: State Regulation and the Public Perspective, 39 IND.
L.J. 1, 8-9 (1963).
135 S. KLAmAN, supra note 132, at 23-24:
The relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets is unique
among capital market sectors. It derives from special institutional arrangements
and techniques of mortgage loan origination and investor acquisition.
Mortgage market participants would regard a secondary market transaction as
one in which, for example, a life insurance company acquired a mortgage origi-
nated by a mortgage company .... In other financial markets, secondary trans-
actions are generally regarded as market trading in existing securities as distinct
from primary transaction in which new debt or equity instruments are created.
But see Jones & Grebler, The Secondary Mortgage Market 199, 200, 202, 209-12, 215 (Real
Estate Research Program, U.C.L.A. 1961) reprinted in G. LErcor, LAND DEVELOPMENT
LAw: CAsms AND MAm i-Ams 683-89 (1966).
136 HousE & HOME, Feb. 1968, at 16.
137 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
138 Housing Act of 1949, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
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suburban building, federal government stimulation of state expressway
construction to open the avenues to suburbia, 39 and the favored income
tax treatment of the homeowner over the renter, add up to a consistent
policy of fostering suburbia's growth.
Although the solution to the Great Depression was to use federal
credit to stimulate private spending, the post-World War II conven-
tional wisdom focused on production and, necessarily, consumption. 140
If sheer production will keep everyone employed and in the long run
filter purchasing power down to the poor, it becomes essential to sus-
tain consumer demand for the products. People must not cease to
desire; and no eccentric bauble, be it an electric toothbrush or an
electric knife, is to be denigrated if consumer demand for it can be
stimulated by the advertising media.'4 ' It is within this context, more-
over, that suburban housing has been carefully nurtured as the key-
stone to consumption of all the paraphenalia of the affluent society. 42
There is more to this, however, than simple pump-priming. In
free-enterprise America, the planning controls are more obtuse than
139 See, e.g., R. CONNERY & W. LEACH, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND METROPOLITAN
AREAs 47-55 (1960).
140 On the importance of production there is no difference between Republicans
and Democrats, right and left, white or colored, Catholic or Protestant. It is
common ground for the general secretary of the Communist Party, the Chairman
of Americans for Democratic Action, the President of the United States Chamber
of Commerce, and the President of the National Association of Manufacturers.
J. GALBaArrH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 122 (1958).
141 J. GALBRArrH, THE NEW INDusTRIAL. STATE 57-38 (1967):
The individual serves the industrial system not by supplying it with savings and
the resulting capital; he serves it by consuming its products. On no other matter,
religious, political or moral, is he so elaborately and skillfully and expensively
instructed.
Specifically, along with the production of goods go energetic and no less im-
portant efforts to insure their use. These emphasize the health, beauty, social
acceptability and sexual success-in sum, the happiness-that will result from the
possession and use of a particular product ... . In turn, inevitably this affects
social values. A family's standard of living becomes an index of its achievement.
It helps assure that the production and, pari passu, the consumption of goods will
be the prime measure of social accomplishment. (Footnote omitted.)
See also, M. HARRINGTON, THE ACCIDENTAL CENTURY 28-29 (1965):
Through one of society's most important educators, the advertising industry, all
of the techniques of science are used for the private socialization of the public
taste. The consumer's "free" choice if thus engineered and calculated as far as
is possible so that it will coincide with the highest profitability to the producer.
The influence of this carefully wrought value system increases as one descends
the social class ladder. As in all things, the poor pay the highest cost and give aid
and comfort to the rich.
142 A. SCHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE POWER 62 (1965):
Two powerful economic forces have played a major part in raising the tempo
of economic growth in the West. They are: (1) the sustained expansion of inter-
national trade, and (2) the great building boom of the 1950s.
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socialism's direct physical control over investments' 43 Here, building
and production remain in private hands, but government is vested
with the duty of maintaining a stable overall economy by manipulating
taxes and credit. Thus, the system constructed to stimulate the demand
for housing has become a control device used to influence the whole
economy. A control device, however, necessitates a valve to be turned
off, in order to dampen demand, as well as on, to stimulate it.
If the decision is made to discourage demand in light of infla-
tionary pressure, FNMA can cease to purchase mortgages, and the
Federal Reserve Board can raise the discount rate, thus forcing com-
mercial banks to hike interest rates and to look for better yields than
those of mortgage loans. Indeed, this was done in 1966-67.144 Thus, sub-
urbia is not an end in itself, but a contrived end which performs a
distinct function in the affluent society as a keystone of the economic
control system.
Nevertheless, this picture of housing as a manipulative factor in
a Keynesian hierarchy does not, in and of itself, necessitate the con-
demnation of suburbia. The very success of capitalism over socialism
in adapting itself to planning in an effort to achieve affluence merits
approbation. Schonfield concluded:
It bears saying again how much more profound was this Keynesian
vision of control through a combination of financial pressure and
improved economic information, than the Socialist formula ... of
capturing the "commanding heights" of the economy.145
John Kenneth Galbraith, however, suggests that this affluence might
be somewhat illusory if the air itself is too dirty to breathe, the water
too polluted to drink, and the schools so bad that it is prudent to boy-
cott them.14 6 Michael Harrington adds that the overemphasis on
productivity and consumption has resulted in a "Reactionary Keynesi-
anism," which simply "reinforces the contrast... between the opulence
of the private sector and the squalor of the public sector.' 47 The time
seems ripe, therefore, to reevaluate suburbia within the broader social
context.
143 In Sweden the policy of full employment is implemented by direct physical con-
trol over investments. Id. at 201.
144 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1966, § 4, at 4E, col. 1-4; TIME, July 8, 1966, at 77;
id., Aug. 5, 1966, at 84; HousE & HoME, Feb. 1967, at 5.
145 A. Schonfield, The Progress (and Perils) of Planning, ENCOUNTER, Aug. 1965, at
32, 84.
146 J. GALBRArFH, supra note 140, at 253.
147 M. Harrington, Reactionary Keynesianism, ENCOUNTER, Mar. 1966, 50, 51.
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E. The Social Price of Suburbia
The emphasis on production in our Keynesian economy assumes
that the resultant full employment and increased personal income will
seep down to the lower orders and thus remove poverty. Presupposing
that the industrial revolution is still alive in the United States, and
that the problem of the poor involves only a lack of income, the
rationale would appear sound. The fates, however, have undercut the
assumptions supporting this Keynesian world and, perforce, have given
the lie to the suburban syndrome.
The United States is no longer involved in the Industrial Era,
for the country has launched into a new epoch, the Technological
Revolution. The computer, automation, systems analysis, consumer
research, cybernetics, and planning have replaced the old axioms of
raw production and natural resources exploitation. Thus:
More and more heavy industrial jobs have been mechanized, auto-
mated, or cybernated. There is a vast migration from secondary
occupations (factory labor) to tertiary ones (the office and service
trades) just as the nineteenth century saw a movement from primary
occupations (agriculture, raw materials) to secondary ones. But the
process will not stop at the factory. Menial office jobs are now being
abolished; middle management's turn could come tomorrow. 148
The Technological Revolution, however, has left innumerable
people ineligible to join the projected march to prosperity. Unskilled
laborers are only the top of the iceberg of people no longer relevant
in a technological era, for the drift from the farm is accelerating. Less
labor is needed on the farms now that machinery is in vogue, and
machinery prices dictate still larger farms, further accelerating the
elimination of farm labor.149 Hardest hit, perhaps, are the southern
148 M. HARRINGTON, supra note 141, at 134. See, J. GALBRAITH, supra note 141, at
267-68:
In the eighteen years from 1947 to 1965, white-collar workers in the United States
-professional, managerial, office and sales workers-increased by 9.6 million. In
these years; blue-collar workers---craftsmer, operatives, and laborers, farmers and
miners apart-decreased by 4 million. By 1965 there were nearly 8 million more
white- than blue-collar workers-44.5 million as compared with 36.7 million.
During these years the number of professional and technical workers, the cate-
gory most characteristic of the technostructure, approximately doubled. No other'
group had increased so rapidly.
149 One could write a history of the United States in terms of the decline of the
farmer. In 1790, for example, 90% of the population made their living farming. Not
until 1920 did urban dwellers exceed rural ones. U.S. BuREAU or THE CENsus, DEp'T oF
COMmERcE, HIsTORicAL. STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATEs 14 (1960). Today rural dwellers
are down to 30%. And we must distinguish between farmers and non-farmers, say tractor
repairmen, who inhabit the so-called rural areas. Indeed, statistics now distinguish be-
tween the "rural non-farin" and the "rural farm" types. The actual farmers now constitute
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farms which once relied upon cheap hand labor to harvest tobacco and
cotton. Indeed, this labor force dropped from 4.2 to 1.7 million be-
tween 1940 and 1960.150
Putting the unskilled to pasture has had a profound effect on the
cities. Just as suburbia has lured away the successful, the cities have
drawn these itinerant "misfits."'151 Assimilation into the normal pat-
terns of society has been barred by racial prejudice and educational
deprivations. 152 Although the Keynesian-inspired conventional wisdom
may have been adequate for the dosing stages of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, the surplus-labor effects of technology, coupled with the economic
barriers inherent in the suburban syndrome, have created a nasty situa-
tion in center city. The addition of the racial problem could only por-
tend an explosion.'53
a mere 6% of our population. US. BuREATU OF TM CENSUS, DEP'T OF ComMERCE, STATIS-
TicA AmrAcrS 605 (1967). Interestingly enough, the average 167-acre farm of 1940 has
become 359 acres, id., which may be on its way to the 600-acre farm of 1980.
150 N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
151 Gavin & Hadley, supra note 118, at 31:
The vast majority of the migrants, both white and black, lack-through no
fault of their own-the education, training, and job habits to fit into the complex
patterns of urban life .... Isolated, discriminated against, lacking the education,
skills, and knowledge necessary in a highly industrialized society, bewildered by
his new environment, the migrant separates from the mainstream of America
and joins the undercurrent-the underculture of poverty.
For the fate of those who stay home, see Schrog, Appalachia: Again the Forgotten Land,
SATURDAY REv., Jan. 27, 1968, at 14.
252 Throughout the 20th century the Negro population of the United States has
been moving steadily from rural areas to urban and from South to North and
West. In 1910, 91 percent of the nation's 9.8 million Negroes lived in the South
and only 27 percent of American Negroes lived in cities of 2.500 persons or more.
Between 1910 and 1966 the total Negro population more than doubled, reaching
21.5 million, and the number living in metropolitan areas rose more than five-
fold (from 2.6 million to 14.8 million)....
Within the cities, Negroes have been excluded from white residential areas
through discriminatory practices.
[To] create an unsegregated population distribution, an average of over 86
percent of all Negroes would have to change their place within the city.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL DisoRDERS, REPORT 12-13 (Bantam 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Civn. DisotDms REPORT].
158 See, e.g., The Moynihan Report, reprinted in L. RMNWATER & W. YANCRY, THE
MOYNmIAN REPORT AND THE PoLrris or CoNTRovEsY 50 (1967):
[It] has to be said that there is a considerable body of evidence to support the
conclusion that Negro social structure, particularly the Negro family, battered and
harrassed by discrimination, injustice, and uprooting, is in the deepest trouble.
While many young Negroes are moving ahead to unprecedented levels of achieve-
ment, many more are falling further and further behind.
After an intensive study of the life of central Harlem, the board of directors
of Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. summed up their findings in
one statement: "Massive deterioration of the fabric of society and its institu-
tions ... 
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Two more factors assured that an explosion would occur. First,
since the system is predicated upon consumption, the person who can-
not consume is relegated to a sociological purgatory. If, through no
fault of his own, he cannot earn the money to become a consumer
either because he is a dispossessed farm worker, alien to the urban
technological environment, or because of the accidental color of his
skin, purgatory becomes hell, and rebellion against this unjust relega-
tion becomes a rational recourse. 154
Second, the renovation of center-city after the image of the sub-
urbanite dream serves to further exacerbate the situation. All too
often the Negro is dispossessed to make room for urban renewal "im-
provements" at the very time that escape to suburbia is closed to
him.155 Thus, the conventional wisdom regarding the societal infrastruc-
If this is so, it is the single most important social fact of the United States
today.
(Italics in original: footnote omitted.) The Report continues:
Until World War II it could be said that in general the Negro and white
worlds lived, if not together, at least side by side. Certainly they did, and do,
in the South.
Since World War II, however, the two worlds have drawn physically apart.
The symbol of this development was the construction in the 1940's and 1950's
of the vast white, middle- and lower-middle class suburbs around all of the
Nation's cities. Increasingly the inner cities have been left to Negroes-who now
share almost no community life with whites.
Id. at 90.
154 CiviL DIoRDERs REPORT, supra note 152, at 274:
Various cultural factors generate constant pressure on low income families to
buy many relatively expensive durable goods and display them in their homes.
This pressure comes in part from continuous exposure to commercial advertising,
especially on television.
Many poor families have extremely low incomes, bad previous credit records,
unstable sources of income, or other attributes which make it virtually impossible
for them to buy merchandise from established large national or local retail
firms.
In this situation, exploitive practices flourish .... Consequently, a special
kind of merchant appears to sell them goods on terms designed to cover the high
cost of doing business in ghetto neighborhoods.
155 Id. at 56:
[I]n Newark, New Jersey, a tumultous meeting of the Planning Board took place.
Until 4 A.M., speaker after speaker from the Negro ghetto arose to denounce
the city's intent to turn over 150 acres in the heart of the Central Ward as a site
for the state's new medical and dental college.
Gavin & Hadley, supra note 118, at 33:
One of the major causes of the Newark riots was a plan to locate the new campus
of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry in the slum area. This
campus would have been beneficial to the ghetto, upgrading the area around it
and providing desperately needed medical services to the community. But the
ghetto residents had not been consulted. They saw their homes and businesses
being demolished at the whim of "they."
In this regard, the ghetto residents may have been far more perceptive than their white
neighbors. See, e.g., Plager & Handler, The Politics of Planning for Urban Redevelopment:
Strategies in the Manipulation of Public Law, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 724, 772-789:
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ture has been proved irrelevant. It remains to be seen what "fault"
the lawyers bear for this tragedy.
IV
THE POLITICIZATION OF SocIAL ENGINEERING
A. The Lawyers and The Society
Earlier it was suggested that a certain inconsistency existed be-
tveen the amazing inarticulateness of lawyers faced with a mundane
social question and the gushing responses of the same group when
faced with a question concerning so-called social engineering. Given
an overhanging branch, the lawyer is aghast and sputters, but given a
policy question whether the consumer or the manufacturer should
bear the loss attributable to accident, he becomes garrulous to a fault.
There may be more than meets the eye, therefore, to the lawyers' claim
that they are "Social Engineers."
The most precise rendering of the social engineer thesis is, without
doubt, the succinct proclamation by Roscoe Pound:
For the purpose of understanding the law of today I am content
with a picture of satisfying as much of the whole body of human
wants as we may with the least sacrifice. I am content to think of
law as a social institution to satisfy social wants-the claims and
demands and expectations involved in the existence of civilized
society-by giving effect to as much as we may with the least sacri-
fice, so far as such wants may be satisfied or such claims given effect
by an ordering of human conduct through politically organized
society. For the present purposes I am content to see in legal history
tie record of a continually wider recognizing and satisfying of
human wants or claims or desires through social control; a more
embracing and more effective securing of social interests; a con-
tinually more complete and effective elimination of waste and pre-
We have examined the decision making process in five urban redevelopment
efforts.
All five efforts require the participation of the local legislative unit of gov-
ernment in the decision-making process. This participation is required by law
and is designed to inject democratic values and some measure of disinterested
planning expertise into the decision. In four of these efforts ... the participation
of the local legislature, as well as other groups in the community, was ritualistic
and formal rather than genuine. By the time the projects were made "public,"
serious debate and decision making had been foreclosed. In these four efforts, the
proponents of the projects were able to monopolize the available political and
planning skills .... The locus of actual power rested on those able to command
the two skills, and regardless of who actually wielded the power the decisions
were managerial or bureaucratic, not democratic.
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cluding of friction in human enjoyment of the goods of existence-
in short, a continually more efficacious social engineering. 156
What is one to make of "efficacious social engineering" in the context
of center-city alight with Molotov cocktails and reverberating to the
cry of "Burn, Baby, Burnl"?
The decision in Brown v. Kendall1s 7 has been defended on the
grounds that it exhibited the wisdom of social engineering.15 8 Whether
there should continue to be liability where harm was inflicted unin-
tentionally and without fault was crucial to the evolution of negligence
law. Chief Justice Shaw did away with the idea of strict liability, and
some commentators have said he did so simply because he disliked
its inhibition of the growth of free enterprise.159 However,
[s]et in his own cultural milieu could not the change have been
inspired by a somewhat broader perspective? Brown itself, after all,
did not involve industry; it involved private persons and a dog fight.
Rather than simply promoting "General Motors," is it riot more
accurate to say that Chief Justice Shaw saw the change in moral
terms as well, as sound policy not only for business but for every
man? Taken at its own face value in its own period, was not the
rule almost inevitable?160
In short, the Chief Justice simply reflected and crystallized conven-
tional wisdom into law.'
6 1
The theory of the lawyer as social engineer working to crystallize
conventional wisdom into law carries with it the most elite overtone,
however, that the wisdom so incorporated includes only the proposi-
tions which, in the long run, are good for the body politic. 62 Brown v.
156 R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 98-99 (1922).
157 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
158 Roberts, supra note 12.
159 E.g., Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. RIv. 359,
365 (1961).
160 Roberts, supra note 12, at 205.
161 Compare, C. SwIsHR, THE SuPREME CoURT IN MODERN ROLE 179-80 (1958):
The Supreme Court is able to lead in constitutional development, then, only
by virtue of the fact that its leadership is of such a character that the people and
their representatives are willing to follow. To put the matter more simply, the
Supreme Court succeeds in leading largely to the extent of its skill not merely
as a leader but as a follower. Since the medium of its leadership is the law, or the
decision of cases in terms of law, we can go further and say that the effectiveness
of the Court's leadership is measured by its ability to articulate deep convictions
of need and deep patterns of desire on the part of the people in such a way that
the people, who might not have been able themselves to be similarly articulate,
will recognize the judicial statement as essentially their own. The Court must
sense the synthesis of desire for both continuity and change and make the desired
synthesis the expressed pattern of each decision.
162 See Cushing & Roberts, Law and Literature: The Contemporary Image of the
Lawyer, 6 VIL.. L. REv. 451, 478 (1961).
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Kendall and Brown v. Board of Education,'m each in its own time,
might not have won a popularity poll, but they accurately mirrored
enlightened opinion of how society ought to be ordered. Still, the
reverberating cry of "Burn, Baby, Burnl" gives the lie to the lawyer
as an effective social engineer, since the very fabric of the body politic
is rent with turmoil. The time has come to reason why.
Michael Harrington poses an interesting exercise in intellectual
counterpoint between the problems presented by the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries:
It has long been recognized that under capitalism there can be a
divergence between the private and social cost of a good or service.
In the dear, dead old days, this divorce appeared manageable and
measurable. A railroad, in its pursuit of profit, would start a new
line. It would cost so much -money for the materials, the engineer-
ing, and the land. But then, there would be another cost. The sparks
from the train would injure trees bordering the track. Who was to
pay, the company or the farmer? That was a relatively easy issue,
and it could be settled in the courts.
But now, as the twentieth century advances, a chasm opens up
between private and social cost. The production of automobiles
plays a role in changing the structure of the family, sexual mores,
and polluting the very air men breathe. The private decision of
real-estate developers to ring a city with carefully zoned, rela-
tively expensive suburbs exacerbates social tensions, segregates edu-
cation on the basis of color and class, modifies the urban tax base
and consequently the political order, and embitters the experience
of old age for those who are left behind.164
Let us pause momentarily to test this thesis of nineteenth-century
simplicity and twentieth-century complexity by running the lawyers
through another exercise in time and motion.
B. Another Study in Time and Motion
1. The Trespass-Nuisance Game Again
The early days of aviation centered around private airports in-
habited by daring pilots who, if the late shows can be believed, con-
tinually zoomed in inches above the houses across the street, then
gunned their engines to skip over the ubiquitous electric line crossing
the end of the runway, and finally skidded to a halt on the dirt field,
inundating the neighborhood with dust as well as noise. These pilots
can easily be cast as the Errol Flynns of this world, and the irate
neighbors seem equally type-cast as the staid and unimaginative yeomen
depicted in Grant Wood's American Gothic. The judges and the law-
163 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
164 M. HARRINGTON, supra note 141, at 26-27.
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yers in this scenario provide the comic relief as they attempt to resolve
the conflict by applying concepts more suitable for use in Restoration
England.
We have already seen that as early as 1815 Lord Ellenborough
sensed the absurdity of holding an aeronaut liable for trespass. For
similar reasons Congress in 1926 enacted the Air Commerce Act,16 5
which declared that "navigable airspace" was part of the public do-
main. In effect, a ceiling was placed over the fee simple; 1000 feet in
congested areas and 500 feet elsewhere. Presumably, the rural yeoman
was still sovereign of his estate up to the new ceiling.
Sir Frederick Pollack in his work on torts, however, had not ac-
cepted in toto Lord Ellenborough's limitation on airspace, reasoning
that an entry over land was a trespass "unless indeed it can be said that
the scope of the possible trespass is limited to that of possible effective
possession, which might be the most reasonable rule."'16 6 The Massa-
chusetts court later found that such could be said in Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co.167 This case arose when a neighbor sought to en-
join, as nuisance and trespass, low-level flights through "his" airspace.
The plaintiff was unable to prove that the noise problem constituted
a nuisance, but he did demonstrate low-level approaches and climbs
over those parts of his 270-acre estate which consisted of brush and
woodland not otherwise utilized.168 These flights, as low as 100 feet,
were held to constitute trespasses, because they passed through the
area of "effective possession," as evidenced by the common height of
New England trees. Such low flights, after all, "create in the ordinary
mind a sense of infringement of property rights which cannot be mini-
mized or effaced."' 169 In a similar vein, the Georgia court in Thrasher
v. City of Atlanta170 reasoned that "legal title can hardly extend above
an altitude representing the reasonable possibility of man's occupa-
tion and dominion."17' Thus, a flight through the zone of "reasonable
possible possession" would constitute a trespass.
The plaintiff in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport72 had done his
homework well, relying on the Smith-Thrasher thesis to allege that he
" 'may reasonably expect now and hereafter to utilize, use and occupy
said airspace and each and every portion thereof to an altitude of not
-165 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
166 F. POLLACK, TORTS 362 (13th ed. 1929).
167 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
168 Id. at 531, 170 N.E. at 393.
169 Id. at 530, 170 N.E. at 393.
170 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
171 Id. at 529, 173 S.E. at 825.
172 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1936).
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less than 150 feet .... , "178 The federal court, however, chose to
base its jurisprudence of ownership on "dominion." In short, "[w]e
own so much of the space above the ground as we can occupy or make
use of,"174 and barring actual possession there can be no trespass through
a vacuum.
Trespass or no trespass, an airport could constitute a nuisance.
Thus, picturesque airports were enjoined if the racket on the tarmac
and the frequency of low-level flights became too much. 175 Indeed, the
Oregon court finally illustrated impatience with the attempt of the
Restatement of Torts to work out the problem in terms of trespass, 176
concluding that it was an attempt "to pour new wine into the old
bottle of trespass."' 771 Instead, the court declared that the law of trespass
was irrelevant; the law of nuisance was alone in point. The impact of
this approach is best illustrated in Brandes v. Mitterling1 8 There, on
a set of facts reminiscent of an old movie scenario, a private airport
was simply abated.
While nuisance doctrine was coming to dominate the stage, how-
ever, the Massachusetts court added a new factor to the equation by
reaffirming its belief in the trespass approach.179 Nuisance doctrine,
after all, centered upon the idea that the airport should be abated.
The trespass approach allowed equity to enjoin low flights as continu-
ing trespasses without abating the airport as a whole. In an opinion
implicit with warnings for the future, Justice Qua gave notice that
noise alone would not sustain the abatement of neighboring air-
ports. In an age of increasing air travel, airports were becoming vital
nerve centers in the economic life of the country as a whole. The day
of the barnstorming adventurers and noisy private aerodromes was
over; the time had come to deal with commercial airports situated in
the midst of burgeoning suburban expansion.
2. Inverse Condemnation
Causby v. United States'80 marked the opening of the next stage
in the law's treatment of the problem. A chicken farmer brought an
action in the Court of Claims to recover for a "taking" of an interest
in his fee simple. His farm was located 2,200 feet from the end of a run-
173 Id. at 756.
174 Id. at 758.
175 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Gay v. Taylor,
19 Pa. D. & C. 31 (C.P. 1932).
176 R=STATEmENT OF TORTS § 194 (1934).
177 Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 633, 355 P.2d 229, 233 (1960).
178 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464 (1948).
179 Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942) (Qua, J.).
180 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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way of an airport that had been taken over by the government during
World War II. The glide path passed only 67 feet above plaintiff's
home. Justice Douglas remarked simply enough, "The noise is star-
tling."''1 On these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the gov-
ernment had "taken" what amounted to an easement through plaintiff's
airspace, and thus was obliged to pay for it.
The idea that a landowner, unfortunate enough to have a glide
path slicing through his airspace under the 500-feet ceiling, could ini-
tiate inverse condemnation proceedings proved vital in Griggs v. Alle-
gheny County.8 2 The county used its power of eminent domain to
collect a large tract of land upon which a new airport was constructed
for the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. Plaintiff lived just outside the
fence, but he discovered that a glide path cut through his airspace.
Since an inverse condemnation claim lay against any entity possessing
the power of eminent domain which had effectively taken property
without actually going through the process of condemnation, plaintiff
initiated a claim against the county based upon the Causby theory.18 3
The state supreme court dismissed the claim on the theory that the
county had not taken the easement, presumably leaving plaintiff to
sue the airlines themselves on the old trespass approach, or to pursue
the federal agency establishing the flight patterns. s4 Justice Douglas,
speaking for the majority, would have none of this, because the county
was the "promoter, owner and lessor" of the installation. The county
had wanted an airport, and it must acquire the requisite land and space
required for the safe operation of such a facility. "Respondent in de-
signing it had to acquire some private property. Our conclusion is that
... it did not acquire enough."' 8 5
It is significant that the law had come to deal with the idea of
space as an interest in land; a slice of airspace could be "taken" and
must be paid for. Presumably airspace could be sold. Thus, it was
conceivable that a building could be constructed in the airspace over a
railroad yard in center-city without the structure being accessioned to
the ground fee. 8 6 This new sophistication is all the more interesting
181 Id. at 259.
182 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
1 3 Congress, in enacting the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, had included
glide paths within navigable airspace, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964), but even at the time
of Causby it had generally been conceded that this would not ipso facto excuse compensa-
tion for the glide path easement over someone's home.
184 869 U.S. at 89.
185 Id. at 90.
186 Thus, the 41-story Prudential Building in Chicago is erected into the airspace
over the Illinois Central Railroad tracks. Ramsey, Cotidominium: The -New Look in
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in light of the unresolved confusion in the law pertaining to over-
hanging balconies.
3. "Progress"
The type-casting in this continuing drama changes considerably.
The gallant barnstormer gives way to the sober airline captain, and
the rural yeomen quit the scene in favor of bustling suburbanites. The
little airport outside the city evolves into a major industry at the same
time the outward expansion of the city population surrounds the site.
Thus, the New York Times Magazine reported:
This victimization of the public has been very democratic,
touching alike all economic classes, from the wealthy homeowners
of Playa del Rey, near Los Angeles's International Airport, and the
6lite of Georgetown, in the path of jets from Washington's National
Airport, to the residents of walk-up flats in South Queens.1s7
The stakes, moreover, grow higher; the New York Times estimates that
the value of claims pending nationwide adds up to $200 million. s8
Technology further aggravates the problem as jets replace piston
powered aircraft. Similarly, the language of technology dominates the
discussion of the problem. Noise is now measured in terms of decibels,
an arbitrary unit of sound measurement, the scale of which assigns "0"
to the threshold of audibility and "120" to the threshold of pain. A
90 decibel measurement causes complaints in the town, and at 105 the
community becomes outraged. Furthermore, the more a community is
exposed to noise, the less its tolerance becomes. 89 The stage is set,
therefore, for the next act, wherein the comedy threatens to become a
tragedy.
Batten v. United States'90 and Thornburg v. Port of Portland'9'
ought to be read in pari materia. The cases have one thing in common
-the appalling predicament in which the claimants found themselves.
In Batten, the claimants moved into a subdivision near a discontinued
Air Force base which was subsequently reactivated and expanded to
accommodate long-range jet bombers and their attendant tankers. On
a typical day, ninety movements were made by jets which warmed up
Co-ops, reprinted in 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JULIAN, BAsIc PROPERTY LAiW 458,
461 n (1966).
187 Sherrill, The Jet Noise Is Getting Awful, N.Y. Times Magazine, Jan. 14, 1968,
at 24.
188 Id.
189 "With one aircraft blast per day, the community will put up with a rating of 115
decibels. But with 128 flights a day, the tolerance level drops to 94 decibels." Id. at 77.
190 806 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
191 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
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for a half hour on a ramp within 650 feet of the plaintiffs' homes, then
proceeded to even noisier preflight activities, and finally made full-
power takeoffs further away.
Strong vibrations cause windows and dishes to rattle. Loud noises
frequently make conversation and the use of the telephone, radio,
and television facilities impossible and also interrupt sleep. During
engine operation in the 100% range the sound pressure level mea-
sured in decibels varies from 90 to 117 decibels on the plaintiffs'
properties. Ear plugs are recommended for Air Force personnel
when the sound pressure level reaches 85 decibels and are required
at or above 95 decibels.
In the summer months when there is an easterly wind, the
black smoke developed during jet take-offs occasionally blows across
the plaintiffs' properties leaving an oily black deposit on the houses
and laundry .... 192
Since plaintiffs in Thornburg lived near a commercial airport, it can
safely be presumed that their lives were no more comfortable.
Despite the horror of Batten's facts, the plaintiffs did not recover.
Although Causby required the government to pay for taking an ease-
ment through airspace, the court was "cited to no decisions holding
that the United States is liable for noise, vibration, or smoke without
, physical invasion."' 93 In Thornburg, however, plaintiffs recovered
on the theory that the noise vector was such an invasion of the plain-
tiff's dominion as to constitute a taking of property.
Given the contemporary American trend toward enterprise liabil-
ity,194 an easy solution suggests itself: Follow Thornburg and impose
costs upon the airport, which in turn will recoup the loss by raising
landing fees, which undoubtedly will be recouped by the carriers from
thieir clientele.195 As a regulated industry, however, the carriers may
not be able to spread their loss over their consumers at the simple
192 306 F.2d at 582.
193 Id. at 584.
194 "In a nation which still winces at the word socialism, the judges have improvised
an ersatz social insurance scheme and have imposed it upon industry." Roberts, Con-
sumer Protection and New Houses: The American Story, 32 CONy. & PaoP. LAw. 21, 25
(1968).
195 Who actually flies?
Private surveys are reported to have shown ... that the median income of passen-
gers frequently using airlines is $17,500, which (if even approximately true) would
indicate that air travel is used by well under 5 per cent of our population....
Nevertheless, the air-pollution and ear-pollution characteristic of environments
surrounding major jet ports, maintained for the convenience of the small,
privileged minority, have turned thousands of square miles of erstwhile pleasant
human habitats into regions to be shunned. The supersonic boom, formerly the
prerogative of the military, may-if airlines have their way-also be put at the
service of the underwear salesmen hastening from here to there.
Vogt, Population Patterns and Movements, in FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH AatEuCA
372, 380-81 (F. Darling & J. Milton eds. 1966).
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flick of a tariff accountant's pen.196 Moreover, it may be in the national
political interest to subsidize a commercial carrier system by policies
encouraging low fares thus creating volume traffic. The carriers con-
tinually re-equip themselves with ever more sophisticated and noisy
equipment in order to remain competitive among themselves, and in
order collectively to compete with foreign countries. This constant up-
grading of equipment, after all, sustains a prospering aircraft industry,
whose healthy existence affects both the national security and the
national economy.'19
Two dissenting opinions merit reconsideration in light of these
reflections. In Griggs v. Allegheny County,198 Justice Black dissented,
not on the ground that the flights failed to constitute a taking, but
because the federal government should have paid the bill instead of the
county. Because its subsidy program was so much a part of the airport
project, the United States, he felt, was the moving party behind the
taking.19 9 Again, in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,20 0 holding
an aircraft manufacturer strictly liable for deaths occasioned in a
La Guardia crash, the dissenters suggested that these were such muddy
waters that prudence dictated some research in depth by a legislative
committee before offhand fabrication of new rules was attempted by
the bench. Thus, perhaps the ultimate solution is some form of sub-
sidy provided by the taxpayer. This, however, suggests that the remedy
ultimately lies within the political rather than the judicial province.
Recent English expedients bear watching since that country is
also an exporter of airplanes. Although the Noise Abatement Act of
1960201 specifically excluded noise or vibration caused by aircraft, the
Airports Authority Act of 1965 took a different path and directed the
Airport Authority to take "such measures as the Minister [of Aviation]
196 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 442-43, 191
N.E2.d 81, 86, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 600 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
197 Consider in light of the balance-of-trade problem the following.
In a joint announcement last week, TWA, Eastern Air Lines and a British firm
called Air Holdings, Ltd., disclosed that they will purchase 144 of Lockheed's
256-pasenger L-1011 air busses ....
•.. This will bring in $625 million for a favorable U.S. balance of $390 million,
and further sales in a market estimated at 1,000 planes by 1980 could raise the
U.S. excess to well over $5 billion dollars.
TiME, Apr. 5, 1968, at 94.
108 369 U.S. 84, 91 (1962).
199 For a capsule look at federal involvement, see R. CONNERY & R. IEACH, THE
FEDaRAL GOVERNMENT AND METROPOLITAN ARF.As 30-35 (1960).
200 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
201 8 & 9 Eliz. II, c. 68. For a summary of this legislation, see [1960] J. PLAN. &
PRop. L. 842.
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may direct for limiting noise . ...,202 Significantly, the legislation
authorized the Minister to "make a scheme requiring the Authority to
make grants towards the cost of insulating... dwellings [near an aero-
drome] ... .-"203 Thus, the solution may lie in an Orwellian future in
which the residents are held hostage inside their soundproofed homes
while aircraft noise holds sway in the open air.20 1
In the meantime, of course, the victims of aircraft noise have
not found the bureaucrats responsive.2 5 Thus, in England, the anti-
noise agitators are both unsuccessful and personally discredited.20 6 In
a similar vein, the New York Times has revealed that "[s]ome officials
think noise protestors are a little odd.' ' 20 7 The ultimate irony, there-
fore, may come to pass when white suburbanites, trapped in the all-
encompassing grasp of aircraft noise, resort to extra-legal means in
order to give witness to their frustrations.2 08
202 Airports Authority Act 1965, c. 16, § 14.
203 Id. § 15. Compare HOUSE & HomE, Feb. 1968, at 8: "If a new sound-control ex-
periment is successful, architect Norman L. Pedersen may well offer homebuilders some
ways to build . ..on marginal land near noisy jetports, highways and factories." The
article goes on to explain that the experiment is being financed by $200,000 put up by
the Los Angeles International Airport and that he calculates that his technique will
increase building costs by something between 4% and 10%.
204 Those who believe that the traditional "castle" would be converted into a prac-
tical prison were not overly pleased when the functions of the Ministry of Aviation were
transferred to the new Ministry of Technology. The Ministry of Aviation (Dissolution)
Order 1967, 1 Stat. Instr. No. 155 (1967).
205 The English have, of course, always been aware of the power of the Civil Service.
See, e.g., C. P. SNOW, COmUMOS OF POWER (1964). Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has popularized
the idea here in A THousAND DAYS 680 (1965): 1
In the thirties conservatives had bemoaned the expansion of the federal
government as a threat to freedom. Instead they should have hailed the bureau-
cracy as a bulwark against change. The permanent government soon developed
its own stubborn vested interests in policy and procedure, its own cozy alliances
with committees of Congress, its own ties to the press, its own national con-
stituencies. It began to exude the feeling that Presidents could come and Presi-
dents go but it went on forever.
206 So far, the anti-noise agitators have come out badly. They are called Colonel
Blimps, middle-class grousers guarding the "territory," alarmists, flat earthers,
anti-libertarians, little Englanders, sentimentalists, sensationalists.
J. Bar, Noise Without End?, NEW Socsxry, July 20, 1967, at 74.
207 Sherriil, supra note 187, at 76 (italics in original). One general was quoted to the
effect that the opponents of supersonic booms are "little old ladies in tennis shoes ...
Id. at 77.
208 The possible impact of the urban environment on the resident causes one to
pause.
[I]n the Midtown Manhattan Study a lot of coldblooded people from Cornell
Medical School sifted through the sample material and sampled 10,000 people
and said 20 per cent of them should be in institutions, 60 per cent of them have
demonstrable mental-whatever they are-aberrations, and only 20 per cent are
clearly free of mental illnesses. From Park Avenue to the East River, including
presidents of corporations, the leadership of America-and 20 per cent of them
should be in institutions.
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V
THE Fu-rupi
A. Social Engineering with a Social Purpose
The rise of suburbia, the growth of airport complexes, and the
demolition of center-city seem diverse phenomena, yet each bears the
common imprint of federal influence. Washington conscientiously
manipulates fiscal devices to implement planned growth. Concomi-
tantly, the business community plans its, own activities within the
interstices of the fiscal matrix in order to maximize productivity and
thus wealth. It is axiomatic that planning is a fundamental adjunct
of the new partnership between government and business designed to
promote affluence and to remove the problem of the poor.
This is nothing more, of course, than the coming of age of the
Keynesian consensus.209 The irony, however, is that recent events in
centercity, to say nothing of recent doubts over the environmental
quality of this affluent ideal, caus6 one to doubt the wisdom of the
consensus. Thus, the President's Commission stated:
The racial disorders of last summer in part reflect the failure
of all levels of government-federal and state as well as local-to
come to grips with the problems of our cities. The ghetto symbolizes
the dilemma: a widening gap between human needs and public re-
sources and a growing cynicism regarding the commitment of com-
munity institutions and leadership to meet these needs.210
Little solace is available for those who have escaped to the suburbs,
.however, for as John Kenneth Galbraith maintains, the entire system
is suspect:
I am not quite sure what the advantage is in having a few more
dollars to spend if the air is too dirty to breathe, the water too
polluted to drink, the commuters are losing out in the struggle to
get in and out of the city, the streets are filthy, and the schools so
McHarg, General Discussion Section, in FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NoRTH AmEmcA 390,
405 (F. Darling & J. Milton eds. 1966).
209 Thus, Andrew Shonfield has argued that capitalism is entering a qualitatively
new stage in which governments consciously pursue and attain full emploment and an
accelerated pace of technological change will become a normal, restless fact of life.
Shonfield, The Progress (and Perils) of Planning, ENcoUNTER, Aug. 1965, at 32. See also
Gavin & Hadley, supra note 118, at 34. "We live in a mixed economy. The debate between
those who believe that private industry is always bad and federal intervention always
good, or that the federal government is always wrong and private industry is always right,
has ceased to, have meaning."
210 Civit. Diso D,,s REoRT, supra note 152, at 283.
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bad that the young perhaps wisely stay away, and hoodlums roll
citizens for some of the dollars they saved in the tax.211
Thus, there promises to be a considerable amount of political activity
as society adjusts to meet these challenges.
Galbraith recently catalogued a series of land-use ills running the
gamut of high rents, uncontrolled subdivision development, slums and
chaotic transportation.2 12 He categorized the land-use controls thus far
employed as "patchwork planning,"21 and offered a two-fold remedy.
The first step is to minimize or neutralize the adverse market influ-
ences. The second is to develop a planning authority of adequate
power. Only strong and comprehensive planning -yill redeem and
make livable the modern city and its surroundings.
Since the focus of market forces is the return to, and capital
gains from, land, this solution means that there must be public land
acquisition wherever market influences are palpably adverse....
And, no less than for the manufacture of automobiles or the coloni-
zation of the moon, it will require the scale, financial autonomy,
control over prices, and opportunity to develop a technostructure
which are the requisites of effective planning.2 14
Thus, we are moving away from government partnership in the main-
tenance of affluence and toward conscious government leadership in
the creation of a decent environment.
At first blush, this sounds very much like social engineering. It
is, but not in the sense that lawyers tend to understand that phrase.
Thus far the lawyers' engineering has been largely commercial and
financial, dealing with such things as wealth transmission, allocation
of losses attributable to accidents, and the credit structure. In short,
they have created and still service the institutions designed to expedite
the production of goods and the consumption thereof on credit, while
at the same time preserving from taxes the wealth derived from these
institutions. Their greatest social engineering triumph was the struc-
turing of a union system to channel the labor unrest of the Great
Depression. This feat brought organized labor into the apparat dedi-
cated to the market system.215 In short, the lawyers' glory and guilt is
211 Quoted by Harrington, "Reactionary Keynesianism," ENcoUNTER, March 1966, at
50-51.
212 J. GAxLaRArrs, supra note 141, at 356-57, 559-60.
213 Id. at 560.
214 Id. at 860-61.
215 See, e.g., M. LEMSER, supra note 109, at 325-24; Roberts, Natural Law Demythol-
ogized: A Functional Theory of Norms for a Revolutionary Epoch, 51 CoRrE. L.Q. 656,
668-69 (1966). Indeed, the craft unions have learned to manipulate the building codes to
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that they built contemporary society in the process of settling disputes
between the various interests which comprise it.
Lawyers' forays into planning have also evidenced considerable
ingenuity if their efforts are graded in terms of the contributions these
schemes have made to affluence. FHA, FNMA and urban renewal have
pump-primed the economy to affluence, as measured by middle-class
prosperity. Evaluated in terms of a decent environment, however, the
lawyers may not be such superb engineers. Indeed, the entire system,
viewed from the perspective of the poor, is a gigantic sociological Edsel.
In light of recent events, it is conceivable that the ad hoc system of
federal fiscal manipulation and private planning will give way to a
system of central planning with compliance assured by the liberal use
of the federal fiscal and monetary powers.216
Change on the local level may include the scrapping of conven-
tional land-use controls in favor of a metropolitan agency vested with
authority to condemn all non-agrarian land-user rights on the fringe,
enabling this land to be fed back into development at the decision of
the agency and not the market.217 The current zoning map, will disap-
pear in favor of parcel-by-parcel development decisions made in ac-
cordance with a master plan. Planning would cease to police untoward
market forces for the purpose of merely preserving the status quo, and
would instead direct the market into an affirmative quest for a decent
environment inhabited by a population neither racially nor eco-
nomically segregated.
their own advantage in such a way that this form of featherbedding unduly increases
the costs of construction.
216 A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 353 (1965):
It is characteristic of the relationship between the public and the private
sectors in America that government, having been formed in the image of private
enterprise, now justifies planning on the ground that it is essentially a private
enterprise technique..It is also noticeable that the most vigorous planning efforts
by the government--outside the field of defence, which is a special case-appear
in those areas where the pressures of private consumption and of private industry
supplying consumer needs actively call for collective action by the public author-
ities. Roads and urban development, as offshoots of consumer demand for more
cars and nicer houses, are outstanding examples. These are of course essential
elements of an economic plan. However, the more profound collective choices,
those which ought to find their expression in a comprehensive national plan for
the distribution of the national product among its main uses, and which are
logically prior to decisions about the level to be reached by particular kinds of
consumer demand, go by default. It is of the essence of planning by business
that it is partial planning. This has been reproduced in the public sector. A
national plan is something quite else; it deliberately engages the transcendent
power of the state in a design which is more than the sum of all the individual
pressures in a society.
(Italics in original.)
217 See, e.g., Reps, supra note 84, at 825.
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B. Training Social Engineers
Should the political climate allow such an effort, the question
must be faced whether the lawyers are adequate for the task of cre-
ating the necessary structure of decision-making agencies and processes.
The adequacy of the lawyers depends in large part on the ade-
quacy of their preparation. Even now, lawyers lament that the recent
graduates do not come to them fully equipped with the local forms
in hand and trained in the nitty-gritty, paper-shuffling details of pro-
vincial practice. At the same time, moreover, social engineering train-
ing is grossly deficient. Although casebook courses in Regulated
Industries and Land-Use Planning have multiplied, the law schools
continue to shield their brood from the empirical complexities of the
society they are supposedly being trained to engineer. If the training
necessary to produce social engineers within the metropolitan law firm
and government agency complex becomes even more sophisticated, it
is likely that law training could diverge into two streams.
There is no real reason why a private lawyer needs more than two
years of academic law. To placate the provincial alumni who now com-
plain about the lack of local detail taught in law school, perhaps another
semester spent' at a bar association technique plant would complete a
student's training. The costs of producing a social engineer, on the
other hand, are appalling to contemplate. Land-use planning, for ex-
ample, without extensive experience with game-system models simu-
lating the market to be regulated, borders on the absurd. Practical data
about ecology, demography and sociology, together with a stiff dose of
economic reality would seem mandatory. Only small groups working in
a problem setting can be effective. Perhaps this group should take only
one year of contemporary classical education in law, and then spend
three more years alternating between the seminar, the field, and the
game table. The cost of this approach, considered solely in terms of
student-teacher ratios, illustrates that we will not be able to afford the
personnel necessary for a truly planned society until several of the
established national universities are, in effect, transformed into federal
graduate universities.
Furthermore, for purposes of training social engineers, the case
system needs some rethinking. Legal concepts, after all, can lead to
absurd scenarios, as our overhanging balcony dilemma illustrated. Al-
though the casebooks are annually crammed with more legal data
served up horn-book style, cases in zoning are a sterile exercise in Neo-
Scholasticism unless rehearsed against an ongoing economic model of
their real environment. More important, the glory of the case system
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requirement, forcing the student to distill a mass of facts down to a few
critical facts organized around a single issue, may have contributed to
legal disasters such as the airport cases. Courtroom law, dictated by the
artificialities of a bloodless trial by intellectual combat, may boil down
to precise isolated issues, but the real world is not an "either-or" place.
Proper social engineering requires dealing in terms of entire systems
involving mutually dependent variables in a state of flux.
Perhaps lawyers qua lawyers are not adequate to the task, and
would be well advised to restrict their activities to the private sector,
leaving the expanded national economic plans and the metropolitan
land-use plans to others. Galbraith, for one, has nominated for the new
elite the members of the "technostructure," whose "specialized knowl-
edge, talent or experience .. is the guiding intelligence-the brain--of
the enterprise,"218 and with whom are associated in positions of ever
increasing influence "a rapidly growing body of educators and research
scientists."219
Indeed, the overhaul of law schools necessary for a conscious effort
to produce social engineers would be so sweeping that the resultant
institution would cease to be a law school, and would become, instead,
a hybrid law-science-planning institute. Since lawYers basically repre-
sent interests, and since their engineering function has been the by-
product of conflict resolution in the courts and legislatures, the two-year
classically trained lawyer should be adequate to the task of representing
the interests involved in the new planned society. The law schools,
perhaps, should leave the job of producing social engineers to an insti-
tute properly designed for the task, and should return to a tightly
disciplined casebook system of training representatives. At the same
time, the promoters of the "planned society" should produce a model of
the institute which would perform the broader social engineering
function.
Apart from law, what would be the format of a planning institute?
Economics, politics and foreign policy would be essential, since even a
fleeting appreciation of our current housing potential necessitates a
grasp of the interrelationship of the gold drain, the balance of trade, the
federal reserve discount rate, the interest payable on demand deposits
in commercial and savings banks, the interest payable upon FNMA
offerings, the bond market and an almost infinite number of other
factors. Ultimately, plans depend upon reasonable projections of the
monies available to implement them. Thus, the study of land-use plan-
ning from an aesthetic or efficiency perspective makes sense only with
218 j. GALRArmrr, supra note 141, at 71.
219 Id. at 282.
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a graph of the mechanics of the economic structure in hand, and with
the realm of the politically possible realized.
A planning institute would treat problems somewhat alien to law
schools, such as the potentialities of genetic surgery and government
control over family planning. Indeed, biology must be included in the
planning curriculum. Architecture and city planning are necessary, and
the humanities are desirable lest the curricula prove too heady.
To balance these technical courses, the institute would have to
develop an intellectual alan rooted in the values of humanism. That is,
while learning the means, i.e., the devices by which environment is to be
controlled, an end worthy of these efforts, i.e., the ideal environment,
would have to be posited as the goal. In short, an environment worthy
of human habitation, created by and for mankind, would have to be the
alpha and omega of the institute. This has been best expressed by a
Marxist theoretician:
To use the modern technical terminology, we can say that Marxist
social science aims at a "hologram" of man instead of a series of
photographs. It is the basic methodological premise and, at the
same time, the discriminating feature of the Marxist approach to
social science, that "economic man," "social man," "cultural man,"
"political man" and similar products of scientific division of labor
are nothing but model constructs, creations of a long process of ab-
straction maturing in institutionally separated micro-social settings.
The only genuine reality, from which all these models depart and
to which they refer, is man as such, pursuing the process of living
through and by his social and cultural environment.... To under-
stand man we have to bring together all that we have dis-
covered while penetrating the different aspect of his unified life-
process .... 220
Notwithstanding the source of these reflections, the elevation of the
study of environment in terms of a hologram of man is a dire necessity
in our contemporary society. The ultimate question facing us is whether
we can construct an environment that will support a standard of life
acceptable not merely in statistical terms, but that one reflects a style of
life worth living, without violence and alienation as its only trademarks.
220 Bauman, Modern Times, Modern Marxism, 34 SOCIAL. RESEARcH 399 (1967). Com-
pare the recent comments of Judge Keating:
Underlying the entire concept of zoning is the assumption that zoning can
be a vital tool for maintaining a civilized form of existence only if we employ the
insights and learning of the philosopher, the city planner, the economist, the
sociologist, the public health expert and all the other professions concerned with
urban problems.
Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893 (1968).
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